A Quiet Word In Your Northern And Shell-Like....

The latest from my regular contributor.

January 12th 2012 was Northern and Shell day at the Leveson inquiry. Northern and Shell is the parent company of Express Newspapers comprising the Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star and the Daily Star Sunday. Amongst questions asked were some about the use of private investigators, 'search agencies', payments, protocols and audit trails.

EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS INTERNAL INVESTIGATION

First to give evidence was Nicole Patterson, barrister, Head of Legal of Express Newspapers. She was then leading an on-going internal investigation into legal compliance 2005-2012, following the News International phone hacking scandal. Her enquiries established the use of 'search agents' and that Express Newspapers journalists

would ask for details of how to contact people or addresses or whatever it was, but I -- at the time that we were looking at, I don't think anybody had really asked, 'How do you do this? How do you find your information?' They were -- as far as we were -- well, I can't say as far as we were aware because until we started having a look at this, I didn't even know that we used these search agencies.

More accurately, there weren't just the five 'search agencies' mentioned in Patterson's evidence which included Express Locate International; Longmere Consultants; Searchline; and SystemsSearches. Passing unmentioned in oral evidence were also AV Legal Services (Leeds) Ltd, AJK Research, BDI (UK) Consultancy and other sources. There is a mass of detailed and informative supporting data in the Patterson Exhibits [NP 2-6] which were not published on the Leveson Inquiry web site until many weeks afterwards thus avoiding much scrutiny (save Reuters, see below).

Oral questioning of Patterson focused in on one particular company used extensively - JJ Services - whose owner Steven Whittamore had been convicted for Data Protection offences early in 2004. Indeed much of the Patterson Exhibits take the form of dense spreadsheets highly reminiscent of the Operation Motorman files.

Q. Right... JJ Services, is that Mr Whittamore's company?
A. I believe it is.
Q. It's clear from documents we are going to look at that your company was engaging JJ Services in 2004 and 2005; is that right?
A. Mm.
Q. Is JJ Services still being used?
A. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Okay. You presumably had in mind the two reports from the Information Commissioner, ""What price privacy?" and "What price privacy now?"
A. Mm-hm.
Q. The papers in the Express Group do feature in the Information Commissioner's table in the second report.
A. Yes.
Q. And we know that JJ Services was really the focus of both reports?
A.Mm.
Q. Did you carry out more detailed enquiries in relation to the activities of JJ Services in 2004 and 2005 of both the financial records and the journalists?
A. No, we didn't...
...the accounts department would have been searching under the name of Whittamore or JJ Services.
Q. What's quite interesting, though, is the dates. The earliest date, at least on this search, is 31 January 2005. He's still carrying out services last year. If you go to 01560 --
A. Mm.
Q. -- you can see the last item there is 30 July 2010 - "Natasha Murat."
A That's a day rate, so £240 would have been a day rate. I don't know what that really means. But the accounts department then prepared this -- the managing editor's office actually prepared this
sheet for me: "Search for possible connection to Robert Murat." What type of search that would have been I really can't tell you. A computer search? I just -- I don't know.
Q. It looks as if your internal inquiry is not getting very far thus far; is that right? 

THE PATTERSON EXHIBITS

Patterson told the Inquiry that the company's internal trawl had showed "more often than not," the amounts paid were neglible: "75 pounds, 80 pounds, 100 pounds. It's very little money." Arguably, even those amounts are quite a lot to pay for mere "...details of how to contact people or addresses or whatever...".

Here are just a sample of the hundreds of 'targets' in the Northern and Shell spreadsheets (Exhibits NP 2-6)

Maxine Carr
Huntley
R Branson
Mark Thompson (Director General BBC)
London Bombers
London Bombings
Millie Dowler (murder victim 2002, Surrey)
David Cameron
Sally Anne Bowman (murder victim 2005, Croydon)
(Tracey) Temple (linked to John Prescott)
(Clive) Bolden (Tracey Temple's ex-husband)
Paul Farrelly (Member of Parliament, Labour, Member of Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 2005-present)
Ken McDonald (former Director of Public Prosecutions)
McCann
Sophia Murat
Litvinenko
Murat
Rob(ert) Murat
Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary)
Clarence Mitchell (spokesman for McCanns)
Kate McCann
Kate McCann
Kate McCann colleague
Kate McCann friends
Ken Livingstone (then Mayor of London)
Sharon Shoesmith (Head of Haringey children's services at the time of the death of 'Baby P')
(Carina) Trimingham (partner of Chris Huhne)
Middleton
David Veness (former Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Operations, Metropolitan Police)
I Puddick
Kelly Hoppen
Bolden
Temple
R(osie) Wintterton (Member of Parliament, Labour)
T(racy) Temple
(Professor John) Tulloch (7/7 London bombing survivor)
C Middleton
Natasha Murat (no relation to Robert Murat)
Rhys Jones (11yr old murder victim, Liverpool)
Vincent Tabak (killer of Joanna Yeates, Bristol)
Jorge Mendonca (former Commanding Officer, Queens Lancashire Regiment, cleared of negligence re Baha Mousa murder)
Stephen Bigby (Oxford St murder victim May 2008)
David Kelly enquiries
Gerald McCann

Just how many times do Northern and Shell need to pay to know the McCann's address?

WHITTAMORE'S 'HIGH-VALUE' COMMISSIONS

When Steve Whittamore's services come under scrutiny, it becomes very clear that most of the high value invoices are from his company. JJ Services has a near-monopoly of high-end commissions, well above the average. The mundane sums of £70-£80 simply do not feature - most of his commissions cost Northern and Shell hundreds, sometimes a thousand or two. Whatever specialist, high-value tasks he was undertaking must have been extraordinarily labour intensive, high risk, sensitive, complex or all of the above.

Here are a sample of Whittamore's 'targets', together with invoice dates and amounts paid. (Exhibit NP2 pp1-3)

* a witchalls 4/24/05 ref 5824 £284,94
* rothermere 2/27/05 ref5797 £2.150,25
* bbc 3/27/05 ref5809 £837.19
* john birt 4/10/05 ref5818 £710,88
* terror bombing enquiry 7/17/05 £1,098,63
* bowman murder 10/2/05 ref5884 £846.00
* oaten 2/2/06 ref5922 £446.50
* alan sugar 3/26/06 ref594 ,£558.13
* temple bolden 4/23/06 ref5951 £1 380.63
* mark thompson 4/30/08 ref16377 £232.65
* farage 6/11/06 ref 5970 £99.88
* middleton 11/5/06 ref 6032 £246.75
* suffolk murders 12/21/06 ref 6053 £ 1,445.25
* murat 8/26/07 ref 6103 £940.00
* mccann 9/22/07 ref 6107 £851.88
* Blankett 8/22 04 ref5707 £2,687.81 (confirmed as transcription error for 'Blunkett' Exhibit NP3 p36)

and see (here).

ROUTINE EXPENSES

Also adduced into evidence to Leveson were some 'taken as read'. Martin Ellice, Group Joint Managing Director of the Northern & Shell Group of Companies, exhibited samples of 3 journalists' expenses claims. Most claims were for takeaways, taxis and tipsters. But one of those journalists detailed some other routine entertaining expenses:
MARTIN STEPHEN ELLICE (taken as read)
Exhibit MSE-1 (here)

p43/80
27/04/2007 £37.50
- Entertaining computer expert contact Steve Whittamore

p48/80
15/05/2008 £9.55
- Entertaining computer contact re telephone numbers

p50/80
02/05/2009 £93.71
- Entertaining computer expert re special enquiries - name available to desk

p56/80
15/05/10 £5.55
- Entertaining computer expert re addresses

All perfectly innocent no doubt, but demonstrating sustained contact with Steve Whittamore and associates long after his conviction (and after the convictions of NOTW Goodman and Mulcaire).

CASH PAYMENTS

At least all the transactions, admin, VAT payable and invoices appear all accountable - even though the exact details of each task brief are not entirely transparent. Clearly Northern and Shell run a tight ship as Paul Ashford (Group Editorial Director) was able to assure the Leveson Inquiry (Paul Ashford Witness Statement here).

Q2: How you understand the system of financial governance to work in principle and in practice at the newspapers owned by your company with particular emphasis on systems to ensure that the newspapers funds are not used to pay bribes or to fund the
gathering of information by illegal methods?
A: The system of financial governance at Express Newspapers, in relation to editorial costs, is as follows: department heads and commissioning editors will commission editorial content. At the end of each month a list of all payments is signed by lan Parrott, Group Managing Editor, and me. lan Parrott and I will query any item which looks out of the ordinary... If a journalist makes a cash payment, they have to reclaim it on expenses, lan Parrott queries all such payments. I understand that they are rare and for relatively small sums.

Strange then that one particular cash expense claim escaped their controlling eyes. The journalist's claim (20/09/2007 p5 here) was for costs incurred for foreign currency exchange. The reason detailed was

Given 1500 euros by office as cash advance to be converted to sterling for cash payment to private eye.

Ian Parrott left Northern and Shell "abruptly" in August 2012. (see here)

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Witness Protection, Anyone?

The latest from my regular contributor.

"The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry and Others Unlawfully Trading in Personal Data"

The first version Serious Organised Crime Agency report (2008) was made public in July 2012. It said (p5) there was evidence that private investigators were
(c) accessing details of current investigations against a criminal or criminal group;
(h) attempting to discover location of witnesses

A second version SOCA report (2008) was published July 2013. That version gave more detail, stating private investigators were also (p6)

(j) attempting to discover identity of CHlSes; (Covert Human Intelligence Sources)
(l) attempting to discover location of witnesses under police protection to intimidate them:

July 2nd 2013
The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) took evidence from SOCA's Chair SIR IAN ANDREWS and Director General TREVOR PEARCE. (transcript here)

HASC Chair Keith Vaz cited recent press reports brought to the Committee's attention: "We have also read that private investigators were hired by criminal gangs to infiltrate the witness protection programme... there are criminal acts that have taken place here. The breaking into the witness protection programme is a pretty serious issue.

Trevor Pearce: Other than seeing in the media reporting, I have never heard anything formerly. As a law enforcement officer who has had some significant engagement with the undercover world and the protected persons’ world, I have not heard of that before."

July 9th 2013 
HASC took evidence from Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) CRESSIDA DICK. Nicola Blackwood MP asked about the security and integrity of the MET witness protection programme given press reports of breaches by corrupt private investigators, as mentioned in the 2008 SOCA Report. CRESSIDA DICK responded by clarifying that the SOCA Report was a "strategic analysis of MET material". so it gave nothing to the MET by way of NEW information. She said however that the MET Directorate of Professional Standards and Witness Protection were "highly alert to the media coverage." A scoping exercice is currently underway. Though it was "not surprising serious organised criminals" might attempt to access information on those in witness protection, "we have not had any examples."

"There is risk..., intelligence sometimes that they are seeking to do so...(but) we are not aware of anything in the Metropolitan Police of infiltration of witness protection."

SOCA REPORT SOURCE MATERIAL
The SOCA strategic analysis utilised five indicative serious crime investigations, plus incorporated intelligence from the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) investigation Operation MOTORMAN. (for background see here)

There was a joint Devon and Cornwall Police/ICO raid at the premises of private investigator John BOYALL which revealed that he and another private investigator - Steve WHITTAMORE- were both engaged in illegal data procurement (here).

The seizure included evidence of attempted access to extremely confidential material, according to ICO investigating officer Alex Owens (p4 here):

One VRM (Vehicle Registraion Mark) particular was of great concern to me because clearly written alongside it was ’Protected Number’; Having served within Special Branch during my Police service I knew this particular VRM must relate to a very sensitive individual or operation within the Police. This was subsequently confirmed to me by the Metropolitan Police although I requested no detail.

Boyall sold information on as he was "Sub-contracted to supply information to Stephen Whittamore. Whittamore, Boyall, King and Marshall (Operation Glade) were charged with conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. Boyall and Whittamore were later charged with obtaining information contrary to s55 of the DPA 1998 and received conditional discharge 15.4.05." (p213 here)

OPERATION CARYATID
One of the five serious crime investigations assessed by SOCA was Operation CARYATID which had resulted in custodial sentences for Clive GOODMAN and private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The Investigating Officer (IO) Keith Surtees described the initial handling of the chaotic Mulcaire papers seized on his arrest (p50 here)

I don't recognise a notebook, because I don't recall actually finding one or seeing one. I do recall lots of loose-leaf A4 pieces of paper, as I've said, with various stages of research on, and I think I refer to that within this decision. I see that through the process of -- I think it's probably from August 9, 10 (2006) onwards. I firstly negotiate a group of officers, I think somewhere in the region of 20 or 30 officers, who I negotiate because they're not anti-terrorist branch officers because they're all busy doing Operation Overt and everything else. They're Special Branch officers, they're vetted to the highest level, and it's those officers, I negotiate their overtime, because they're working through weekends when they should be off, and they work through I think for a period of five to seven days to go through all of the documentation, and with that they're briefed by me at the beginning around what I want them to do with that in the first instance, which is to ascertain whether there's anything to undermine or assist the police case with regard to Goodman and Mulcaire, because by then we've charged both Goodman and Mulcaire and my obligations under CPIA kick in

THE MET GIVES EVIDENCE
A flawed victim notification policy was challenged later, in September 2011, when there was the Judicial Review -

THE QUEEN on the application of (Claimants) ,CHRIS BRYANT MP, BRIAN PADDICK, LORD PRESCOTT, 'HJK', BEN JACKSON
and the COMMISSIONER of the POLICE of the METROPOLIS (Defendant)

The claimants alleged the MET had failed to notify them that they had been phone hacking targets of private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The MET's Mark Maberly was required to give a statement in evidence. He had been Case Officer of the original investigation into Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire - Operation CARYATID. Maberly's statement said (para 50)

On 23rd November 2006 a report was produced by the Directorate of Professional Standards which detailed the results of the examination of the computers and other storage media recovered during the original searches. The report would have been collected shortly after. Included within the report was a computerised address and phonebook of contacts including potential targets. The contents of the report were brought to the attention of the Investigating Officer Keith Surtees. Following on from receipt of this report and in consultation with the SIO, DC Green and I met with an officer from the witness protection unit. There was concern that within the contents of the report were the details of persons who were given new identities as part of a witness protection programme. Those in the programme would include both witnesses and defendants to high profile serious crime. I provided the list for him to view and it quickly became apparent that contained within were names of interest to him. I provided him with a copy of the report to take away. I had no further contact with this officer about the report or the details contained within.

Keith Surtees' evidence to Leveson concurred (p72-73 here):

MR JAY: There were names though in the project list, as it were, that according to Detective Sergeant Maberly were on the witness protection programme. Is that something you knew about?
A. Yes. It was brought to my attention that some names here within this document may well have been from the witness protection programme. What I instructed DS Maberly to do was to contact the witness protection unit, get them to come across to our office, show them the document, get them to look at it, and if there were any risks to people they were protecting, take whatever mitigation they needed to take to protect them. I didn't ask or seek information from the witness protection people around the quantity or individual details of who --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not individual details, but weren't you interested to know whether it was in fact the case?
A. I knew it was the case on some of them because it was quite obvious it was the case.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Didn't that itself create an enormous issue for you? This must be among some of the most confidential information that's held.
A. Yes, and the officer from the witness protection unit was best placed to take whatever remedial action needed to be taken in regards to that. In terms of the provenance of the information, that also concerned me, yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you didn't do anything about that.
A. I had conversations throughout May, June, July and August in terms of the investigation. I had conversations August, September, October, November with regards to the various drips of information that were coming through, and briefed those up.
Q But in that context, if the conspiracy was limited to Goodman and Mulcaire, there would be concern but there wouldn't be enormous concern, but if the conspiracy went wider, as you suspected it did, to others at News International, that concern would be multiplied, wouldn't it, in relation to possible prejudice to those on the witness protection programme?
A. Witness protection programme, access to government ministers, access to military, right across. There were lots and lots of concerns, yes, including the witness protection issues, yes. 

CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, this seems to be the chain of communications:

- Metropolitan Police Service SPECIALIST OPERATIONS undertook the original phone hacking investigation - Operation CARYATID - into Goodman and Mulcaire.

- The CARYATID Team borrowed a crew of expensive SPECIAL BRANCH officers with elite Developed Vetting status to undertake a preliminary sift and summary of the Mulcaire papers.

- The resultant summaries revealed that multiple, highly sensitive witness information had been compromised. That sensitive information was communicated to the WITNESS PROTECTION UNIT by the Investigating Officer, who also briefed it up through SPECIALIST OPERATIONS.

- Then the MET provided SOCA with extensive information on the Goodman/Mulcaire investigation for strategic assessment. SOCA undertook its crucial risk analysis , including CARYATID and MOTORMAN, and circulated their restricted Report to key senior policy-makers and agencies.

- The MET was provided with the SOCA Report in Feb 2008. The Director General of SOCA believes it would have gone to the Directorate of Professional Standards and/ or to the Deputy Commissioner.

But five years later, in 2013, neither SOCA nor current ACSO MET SPECIALIST OPERATIONS have ever heard of any private investigator compromising highly secret witness protection data. And that is despite two senior (still serving) officers giving very public evidence twice - to the Judicial Review and to the Leveson Inquiry.

Hackgate has certainly prompted senior rank resignations at the MET. But this can only partially account for the apprently poor 'corporate memory'.

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

The Met - Red Flags And Red Tops

The latest from my regular contributor.

Looking back at the early 'red flags' of corruption and the tabloids is instructive. This post will look at warning signs at the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS or MET) in the period, roughly 2000-2005. It's a convenient timespan as it coincides with three top level rank constants -

Commissioner - John STEVENS
Deputy Commissioner & Director of Professional Standards (DPS) - Ian BLAIR
Director of Public Affairs (DPA) - Dick FEDORCIO

Indeed the senior ranks charged with anti-corruption responsibilities read like a succession of a Who's Who name-checked at the Leveson Inquiry.  Or perhaps a tortuous biblical genealogy in which Andy HAYMAN begat Bob QUICK who begat John YATES who begat Peter CLARKE etc.  Other less senior and lesser known names also recur, providing evidence of knowledge continuity of dangerous red flags at the MET - who knew what when - Shaun SAWYER, Andre BAKER, Dave COOK, David ZINZAN, Maxine de BRUNNER, Dean HAYDON, Brendan GILMOUR, Tony FULLER and so on...

Three significant MET investigations should have raised red flags in 2000-05 - Operations Abelard1, Motorman and Glade. Three more red flags were raised by key extracts from (unrelated) Reports highly critical of professional standards and press office/public affairs at the MET. These high profile criticisms were  the Virdi Inquiry Report, Damilola Taylor Review and the Morris Report.

BACKGROUND to 2000
The late 1990s had seen well publicised anti-graft initiatives at the MET, keeping Anti-Corruption Command (formerly CIB, Complaints Investigation Bureau) very busy, such as the Rigg Approach investigation led by Shaun SAWYER (here).

A parallel anti-corruption investigation was underway under John YATES - Operation Russia (here).  Also at Anti-Corruption Command was Dean HAYDON (here), later to become Staff Officer to John YATES and head ed Operation Varec (here).

A third relevant investigation was the linked Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges (here) probing police corruption, press 'dark arts' and the murder of Daniel Morgan (here) - under the command of Andy HAYMAN at Professional Standards (DPS). Andre BAKER was then senior homicide detective for South East London. On the team too at Anti-Corruption Command was then Detective Superintendent Bob QUICK. Operation Nigeria uncovered very serious red flags re newspapers, for example, a leak from the 1999 murder of Jill Dando which resulted in a detective's forced resignation. (here)

QUICK was so concerned about the intelligence uncovered that he submitted a report to HAYMAN in 2000

highlighting the role of journalists in promoting corrupt relationships with, and making corrupt payments to, officers for stories about famous people and high profile investigations in the MPS...I proposed an investigation of these newspapers/officers on the basis that I believed that the journalists were not paying bribes out of their own pockets but...the newspaper organisations were aware of the reasons for the payments and were themselves complicit in making corrupt payments to police officers.

THE VIRDI INQUIRY REPORT 2001
An investigation which scrutinised processes and policies relating to a contentious grievance, disciplinary and racism case.  In particular, the Report red flagged HAYMAN'S Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) and FEDORCIO'S Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA).

The Report (here) included two letters from Andy HAYMAN - the first said, sadly, DCS BAKER was unable to locate relevant search procedure notes as none were kept. The other letter (Appendix 13b) said he was willing to allow the Virdi Inquiry access to the press file only under very stringent conditions.  In the event, that didn't happen

This Inquiry has repeatedly requested an opportunity to view the DPA press file and associated papers on Police Sgt Virdi. Regrettably, at the time of writing, the MPS Directorate of Public Affairs has not produced these papers.

Virdi's view was

that the MPS appear to have a close relationship with particular journalists, providing them 'misleading information' as well as leaking 'details of our solicitor's confidential letter'... (and) proves the collusion of certain officers of the MPS and the Daily Mail... No-one has been disciplined on this matter.

Additionally in 2001, the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) ratified its ethical Editors' Code of Conduct, Glenn Mulcaire signed his first lucrative contract with NOTW, Dick FEDORCIO became a full inner sanctum member of the MET Management Board and - in Plymouth - Operation Reproof started scoping into police corruption and illegal data harvesting (here).

ABELARD1 2002-3
Operation Abelard1 was launched by DPS Intelligence Development Group (IDG) - reopening the investigation into Daniel Morgan's murder.  Shaun SAWYER had become head of Anti-Corruption Command after HAYMAN joined Norfolk Police as Chief Constable. Abelard1 was led by David ZINZAN and fronting the public appeal for information was David COOK, working under Commander Andre BAKER. At that time, Brendan GILMOUR transferred from South East London Murder Investigation Team to the DPS - firstly to the Intelligence Development Group (IDG), then Anti-Corruption Command.

As the public face of the murder enquiry, COOK was allegedly targeted for surveillance by NOTW and Morgan murder suspects.  COOK confronted Rebekah Brooks face-to-face - the meeting facilitated by BAKER and Dick FEDORCIO (see here)

DAMILOLA TAYLOR REVIEW 2002
The Damilola Taylor Investigation Review Report into the 10yr old schoolboy's murder was published. (here).  It castigated press coverage, especially "the unauthorised disclosure of one piece of critical evidence found during the post-mortem examination of Damilola..." A tabloid newspaper published "the detail after the suspects were charged and evidential difficulties arose as a result... It is possible that the leak did in fact come from within the police service." Yet another red flag.

Despite known difficulties with substantial newspaper rewards being offered in high profile murders, the Daily Mail put up £50,000 - reluctantly endorsed by the MET: "Benefits and difficulties were identified, not least the desirability of witnesses emerging as a matter of principle rather than recompense." (p22)  That is exactly what happened; the prosecution case failed in court through the unreliable evidence of 14yr old girl (witness 'Bromley') alleged to have to been motivated by the reward money.  (Daily Mail)

Immediately the case collapsed, child witness 'Bromley' and her mother were stashed in a hotel in Blackheath where it had been arranged with the MET press office they would meet reporters from the News of the World and the Mail on Sunday. A deal was agreed with "the senior press officer at the Metropolitan Police, to pay £45,000 for the Bromley interview." (Guardian)

Yes. Yes, that's correct.  A senior press officer from the FEDORCIO'S Directorate of Public Affairs was acting as agent and broker in a tabloid bidding war - for an exclusive interview with a vulnerable 14yr old girl, in a hotel paid for by the News of the World.

Why?  And on whose authority?

Reneging on their bid agreement lost NOTW their exclusive and incurred a costly employment tribunal, heard amongst acrimonious allegations of police corruption and NOTW leverage deals with the MET to suppress embarrassing stories.  Even that leverage deal was reneged on. It wasn't until more than a year later, in an apparently unrelated incident, the same MET press officer was reportedly suspended on suspicion of the disclosure of unauthorised information to journalists. (Guardian)

OPERATION MOTORMAN 2002-3
It led on from Operation Reproof. It was an Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) investigation into 'industrial scale' Data Protection infringements by private investigators, via corrupt public officials, for a large number of national newspapers. (for background see here).

In March 2003, Rebekah Brooks (then Wade) admitted paying police officers fo information (Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee 2003)

OPERATION GLADE 2003-4
Briefed on Operation Motorman's extensive seizures by ICO Senior Investigating Officer Alex Owens, in May 2003 the MET Department of Professional Standards started its own Operation Glade.  It was an  (p3 here)

investigation into the unlawful disclosure of confidential Police National Computer (PNC) records, in the form of criminal record office (CRO) histories and registered keeper details of privately owned vehicles... passed in to the national press in exchange for monetary payment. 

Glade was led by Det Superintendent Tony FULLER, with Brendan GILMOUR as Investigating Officer. Early in 2004, seven journalists were interviewed under caution but none were prosecuted.  A civilian police worker, ex-MET police officer and two private investigators were subsequently convicted for conspiracy to commit misconduct in a public office and data protection offences.  Operation Glade was clearly yet another red flag.

THE MORRIS REPORT 2004
'An Independent Inquiry into Professional Standards and employment matters in the Metropolitan Police Service'  Its focus was how the MET treated its own officers when they were investigated for alleged misconduct and/or criminality.  The inquiry looked at issues such as accountability and scrutiny of DPS and recommended a fundamental overhaul under the personal direction of the Commissioner.  Now under Dep Asst Commissioner Stephen Roberts, criticism was made of poor practices (p142)

I strongly believe that DPS is not properly regulated and that they think they can do as they please without fear of an investigation into their own activities.

They "did not record all the important decisions on the cases... there can be no confidence that the necessary rigour has been brought to bear... It also makes it difficult to track the thought processes and reasons for decisions made, which is vital." (p161)

Disclosure was refused "just 3 weeks prior to the hearing, citing that some of the documentation was subject to a Public Interest Immunity and could not be disclosed. Why did it take DPS 4 months to respond to the original disclosure request?” Another said the DPS "simply ignored the requests.”  (p171)

Leaks and negative briefings to the press

We asked the MPS to comment on some of the issues arising out of the evidence, in particular the question of information which some officers felt had been leaked to the press. Mr Fedorcio outlined the MPS’ procedures as follows: 'Where we believe unauthorised information has been given to the media the press officer will bring this to the attention of the investigating officer

We have received evidence that suggests that unofficial press releases or comment is made about individuals. The MPS denies this.

I was ordered by my senior officers not to talk to the media in my own defence and...the MPS did nothing "to counter the stream of largely false and damaging articles.

- (DAC Brian Paddick) p170

Arguably these failings echo those of the later investigation Operation Caryatid into phone hacking by Goodman and Mulcaire. Is it at all credible that no-one made any connections? Yet Brendan GILMOUR asserted to Leveson "In 2003, the concept of the national newspapers routinely using police employee to source sensitive information was still relatively unknown. On this basis I believe the MPS response was appropriate." Surely even by then there were more than enough red flags to make bunting for Scotland Yard?

Sir John STEVENS stepped down as Commissioner of the Metropolis in 2005.

Related Articles
Hackgate - Issues For The Burnton Inquiry Into The Murder Of Daniel Morgan
Hackgate - The IPCC and Surrey's "Collective Amnesia"
Hackgate - Alex Marunchak - Presumed Innocent
Hackgate - Springwatch
Hackgate - Elveden: Murdoch Or King Cnut?
Hackgate - Elveden - Murdoch's Catch 22
Hackgate - April Casburn's Conviction - Myths And Misconceptions


You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Issues For The Burnton Inquiry Into The Murder Of Daniel Morgan

The latest from my regular contributor.


Home Secretary Theresa May gave evidence to Leveson plus a wealth of additional material.  Exhibit TM1 includes a detailed list of 27 concurrent 'Inquiries/Enquiries/Reviews re Phone Hacking', as at October 2011 (pp 433-4).  No 4 on her list is:

Operation Tuleta - police investigation into hacking in general terms and so far involves consideration of hard drives, and other documentation seized in historic Operations (including Ops Glade, Motorman, Millipede, Abelard 2, Nigeria, Two Bridges, Abelard 1 and Russia).

Five of those eight named police investigations relate directly to the savage murder of Daniel Morgan (see here).  It is also striking that ALL EIGHT of those Operations named by May can potentially be linked to Southern Investigations (here).  The lesser-known Operations are (from Time Line of events and linked investigations, Appendix A, Operation Abelard 2 Review)

- 1987 - Operation Russia - A covert investigation into police corruption particularly in South East London

- 1997 to January 1999 - Operation Nigeria - MET assessment and commencement of covert police investigations

- January 1999 - Operation Two Bridges - Additional MPS covert investigation examining police corruption and the murder of Daniel Morgan. Enquiry revealed information pertinent to the murder investigation. Charges brought in connection with an unrelated matter.

- May 2002 - Operation Abelard 1 - MET launched a fresh covert investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan. Led by the Directorate of Professional Standards.

Also linked to these investigations, and with overlapping oversight, are 3 senior MET officers - Andy Hayman, Andre Baker, John Yates.

HAYMAN

Hayman was MET Commander focusing on anti-corruption during Operations Russia, Nigeria, and Two Bridges. On return to the MET from service as Chief Constable of Norfolk, Hayman was MET Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) with overall responsibility for Operation Caryatid - the original phone-hacking investigation into NOTW (News of the World)'s Goodman and Mulcaire.

BAKER

Andre Baker has not received the same levels of public scrutiny as Hayman or Yates -  see here for more depth.

Baker was Head of Homicide for London in 2002 at the time of the Operation Abelard 1 investigation into Daniel Morgan's murder. Detective Superintendent David Zinzan led operations, with Detective Chief Superintendent Dave Cook fronting the Crimewatch appeal for new information - his immediate superior was Baker. Ultimately the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) determined there was insufficient evidence for a prosecution. Following the CPS decision on the Zinzan-Cook investigation, all eight suspects arrested were released (see here).

That 2002 Crimewatch appeal allegedly prompted Daniel Morgan murder suspects to instigate NOTW surveillance of DSC Cook and his wife, Jackie Hames. That Cook-Hames surveillance jn turn led to an infamous confrontation meeting between Rebekah Brooks, Dick Fedorcio, DCS Cook and his boss Andre Baker (see here).

From January 2006, Baker was Deputy Director of SOCA (Serious Organised Crime Agency) - ie throughout investigations Operation Caryatid (phone hacking) Operation Millipede (computer hacking) and Operation Abelard 2 (the fifth investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan).

YATES

John Yates was Detective Superintendent in MET Anti-Corruption Command and led during part of Operation Russia at the time of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges investigations of Southern Investigations - in which NOTW were implicated.  In 2006, Yates was appointed Assistant Commissioner for MET Professional Standards, then all Serious Crime, then from 2009 Specialist Operations/Counter-Terrorism. 

This means Yates had SIMULTANEOUS overall responsibility for BOTH the NOTW-tainted Operation Abelard 2 (2006-11 Daniel Morgan's murder investigation) AND the controversial re-evaluations (2009-11) of Operation Caryatid (NOTW phone hacking).

CRITIQUING YATES

Two Parliamentarians raised pertinent issues in the House of Commons:

Gordon Brown, Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, Labour  (Hansard 13 July 2011, c402)

No action from the head of the first police inquiry, Andy Hayman, whose next job just happened to be at News International; no action from his successor, who had overall responsibility for two inquiries—Mulcaire and Abelard, or what is called Southern Investigations—each with vast but unexamined archives exposing criminality on a huge scale.

Tom Watson,West Bromwich East, Labour (Hansard 11 July 2011, c46)

As head of Operation Abelard, John Yates would be aware of paperwork showing convicted private investigator Jonathan Rees discussing the use of covert surveillance techniques, including computer hacking, with a close associate of Rebekah Brooks, Mr Alex Marunchak. Rees, while serving time in prison, discussed his contact with reporters from The Sunday Times. Far from this scandal being about wrongdoing at the News of the World, it is a story of institutional criminality at News International. John Yates’ review of the Mulcaire evidence was not an oversight. Like Andy Hayman, he chose not to act. He misled Parliament. 

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

Yates was apparently very keen retain Gold Group oversight, and not to relinquish evaluation of phone-hacking evidence outside his own Specialist Operations/Counter-Terrorism command. He of course had the alternative to recuse, and request that the Commissioner allocated the task of establishing the facts of Operation Caryatid to another MET command.

A different Command may not have lacked expertise and experience in bringing offences of blagging and hacking to successful prosecution. For example, at the same time as the Operation Caryatid investigation, is the 2006 case of private investigators Sharon and Stephen Anderson - blaggers of bank, tax, utilities and telephone accounts (see here).

Or (as yet unlinked to Hackgate) the network uncovered by Operation Barabatus in 2006-7. it exposed a criminal chain of former police officers-turned-private investigators hacking computers, using Trojan viruses, and illegally accessing the Police National Computer (PNC) data via serving officers. Eight men were convicted. (here)

So it appears there was no lack of appetite from other parts of the MET to pursue similar cases - with similar modus operandi.

ABELARD 2

March 2006 - the fifth Investigation into Daniel Morgan's murder is launched under AC John Yates, Commander Shaun Sawyer and with Dave Cook as operational lead (seconded from his then post at SOCA). [David Zinzan of Abelard 1 and Shaun Sawyer of Abelard 2 are now respectively Deputy Chief Constable and Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police.]  Abelard 2 arrests followed in 2008 but, by March 2011, the case collapsed under the weight of disclosure obligations and allegations of police corruption (see here).

COOK

Dave Cook was arrested on 10th January 2012. Despite being an alleged victim of NOTW surveillance and civil litigant, Cook himself was suspected of making unauthorised leaks to a journalist and, to date, remains un-charged on bail. (Guardian)

He was arrested after the IPCC was passed information in mid-December by Metropolitan police detectives working on Operation Elveden, which is investigating alleged payments to police officers by newspapers.  Investigators working for the police watchdog have powers of arrest when carrying out an independent investigation. It is not clear why the Met did not carry out the arrest and instead passed the inquiry on to the police watchdog. A spokesman for the Met would not comment.

Cook's arrest by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) rather than the MET is indeed curious - as is this nugget from John Yates witness statement to the Leveson Inquiry:

I should add that I have been asked by the IPCC to provide a witness statement whether I authorised former Detective Chief Superintendent David Cook to provide specific information to a named journalist for specific operational reasons relating to the reinvestigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan.  I am happy to confirm that I did and will provide to the IPCC a witness statement to this effect.

Curiouser and curiouser.

In mid-May 2013, Yates wrote a lengthy article for the Independent on Sunday (here) about the Daniel Morgan murder investigations and the announcement of the Burnton Panel inquiry:

I had overall responsibility for the case from 2006 until the collapse of the last trial at the Old Bailey in March 2011... the panel will also pay particular attention to the role played by Detective Chief Superintendent Dave Cook...an extremely able and committed detective...Disturbingly, he provides an astonishing link between Southern Investigations, the News of the World and phone-hacking when, in July 2011, it was revealed that the paper had used the detective agency to tail Det Ch Supt Cook and his wife at the height of his involvement in leading the murder investigation.

If Yates found this "astonishing" and a revelation to him when it "emerged" in 2011 then you have to wonder who (for more than a decade) was providing him with the selection of press cuttings relevant to his rigorous investigations - the News of the World?

THE BURNTON PANEL INQUIRY
Home Secretary Theresa May said:

The horrific murder of Daniel Morgan and subsequent investigations were dogged by serious allegations of police corruption. Several criminal investigations failed to bring those responsible to justice and this independent panel will leave no stone unturned to find out why.  I am delighted Sir Stanley Burnton has accepted the responsibility of chairing the panel. He brings an enormous amount of expertise from a long career at the top of the legal profession.  The terms of reference under which the panel will operate were also announced today.

And

Importantly, the Panel’s work will put Mr Morgan’s family at the centre of the process and the approach to this issue has the support of the MPS Commissioner and the Independent Police Complaints Commission... the Panel will seek to address the questions arising, including those relating to:
• police involvement in the murder;
• the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption;
• the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and journalists
at the News of the World and other parts of the media and alleged corruption involved in the linkages between them. 

Those are three very weighty aims that clearly cover many of the issues being investigated by Operation Tuleta - and more.

Whilst the Burnton Panel "will ensure maximum possible disclosure of all relevant documentation, including information held by all relevant Government departments and agencies and by the police and other investigative and prosecuting authorities", no more details are so far available. Yet to be announced is the list of Panel members, and there is no indication on whether the Panel can compel witness evidence or only hear from willing witnesses. Neither is there an indication that evidence sessions will be public.

The timing of the Burnton inquiry is a little sketchy.  It is intended to take 12 months to Report, but mirrors the dilemma of Leveson Inquiry (Part 1) if it is unable to address the required specificity should that risk prejudicing ongoing criminal investigations or trials.  Yet anything less than a full, independent, forensic inquiry would betray assurances to Daniel Morgan's family and further damage public trust.

That is, unless the Home Secretary anticipates charges, trials and convictions soon under Operation Tuleta - or even Operations Russia, Two Bridges, Nigeria, Abelard 1, Motorman, Glade, Caryatid or Abelard 2.

Seems like a tall order.


Related Articles
Hackgate - The IPCC and Surrey's "Collective Amnesia"
Hackgate - Alex Marunchak - Presumed Innocent
Hackgate for Beginners - The Murder of Daniel Morgan
Hackgate - Springwatch
Hackgate - Elveden: Murdoch Or King Cnut?
Hackgate - Elveden - Murdoch's Catch 22
Hackgate - April Casburn's Conviction - Myths And Misconceptions
Hackgate - Varec Revisited - Dissent In The Ranks


You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

The IPCC and Surrey's "Collective Amnesia"

Published in late April '13, the Independent Police Complaints Commision (IPCC) Commissioner’s Report entitled 'IPCC independent investigation into Surrey Police’s knowledge of the alleged illegal accessing of Amanda (Milly) Dowler’s mobile phone in 2002' runs to just 6 scathing pages.  Its key observation is that

former senior officers at Surrey Police were 'afflicted by a form of collective amnesia' in relation to the force’s failure to investigate an allegation in 2002 that the voicemail of Amanda (Milly) Dowler had been hacked by the News of the World (NOTW).

The relevant documents in the public domain consist of a letter from Surrey Police to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (CMS) on Surrey's own investigation (Operation Baronet), evidence read-in to the Leveson Inquiry from the Metropolitan Police Service (MET), as well as that IPCC Commissioner's Report.  The latter specifically focused on the referrals of Maria Woodall and Craig Denholm for potential recordable conduct.

MARIA WOODALL

Then: In 2002, Maria Woodall was Detective Sergeant and Action Team Manager of Surrey Police's investigation Operation Ruby into the abduction of missing teenager Millie Dowler. She appears to have been frank with the IPCC that the hacking of Millie's mobile phone by NOTW was known by several on the investigation team - for example, DC John Lyndon's 23rd April '02 log entry (p14)

...in light of the News of the World revelation that they or a third party has accessed the voicemail it is possible that the messages had previously been listened to by unknown persons and deleted.

Millie's mother Sally recounted to the Leveson Inquiry (p14) her own suspicions that NOTW had intercepted family phones to get a particularly intrusive story for publication ('The Longest Walk').

Woodall's referral to the IPCC  however was not about 2002. She was investigated for allegedly failing to pass on knowledge of NOTW's hacking later during the investigation which led to the convictions of Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire (p4):  

The case against her rested on her actions and knowledge in 2007, when the first phone hacking convictions took place. It is clear that at that point she accessed the HOLMES system to view documents from 2002 associated with phone hacking.

Though the IPCC investigation "concluded that there was no case to answer for misconduct."  From 2006, Operation Ruby's Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) was Detective Chief Superintendent Mark Rowley. It is not known if Woodall informed him of her HOLMES searches.

Now: Temporary Detective Superintendent Woodall is about to leave Surrey for a new job with the City of London Police.

STUART GIBSON

Then: Detective Chief Inspector Gibson was the initial appointed Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) when Millie Dowler disappeared in March 2002.  It has been alleged that Gibson was one of the Surrey officers who met with NOTW senior journalists and were told of the hacking. (here)

Documented evidence of his meeting(s) with NOTW are missing.  Within a few weeks, Gibson was removed from Operation Ruby. The conclusions from a progress review by Sussex Police undertaken in the summer of 2002 are here.

At the same time, there was adverse criticism from the press - one "describing the investigation under DCI Gibson as 'rudderless' and this media coverage has since been described by (then Deputy Chief Constable) Peter Fahy as 'a factor in replacing the SIO for [the investigation]".  (p9)

Now: Stuart Gibson is retired.

The IPCC Investigation also states that amongst senior officers interviewed were those at Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) level.

CRAIG DENHOLM  (ACPO level)

Surrey Police's evidence to the CMS Committee and the Leveson Inquiry came from Assistant Chief Constable Jerry Kirkby. Normally, both might have warranted the attention of the force Chief Constable.  However, Surrey's Chief Constable Mark Rowley had just left for a new post with the MET and Temporary Chief Constable Craig Denholm was himself implicated as the focus of Operation Baronet.

Then: In 2002, Detective Chief Superintendent Denholm (Head of Crime) was Overall Officer in Charge (OOC) of Operation Ruby - the immediate superior officer to SIO Stuart Gibson.

The case against Denholm "rested on his claim to have had no knowledge about the alleged hacking of Milly Dowler’s phone before this was revealed publicly in 2011. Given the extent of knowledge within the investigation team, and Surrey Police as a whole, and the fact that this was referred to in documents which he is known to have received, the investigation found it hard to understand how he, the officer in charge, could not have been aware of the alleged hacking. But despite detailed examination of all extant documents and interviews with all relevant witnesses, the investigation was unable to find any witness or documentary evidence that contradicted Mr Denholm’s own repeated assertions to the IPCC that he did not know, and had not made the relevant connections. In view of that...there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a case to answer for gross misconduct."

Now: Denholm has just been appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Hampshire Police. Its Chief Constable Andy Marsh said: "Craig is an experienced and very capable DCC with a good track record of leadership and delivery of excellent policing services to the public."

MARK ROWLEY (ACPO level)

Then: Rowley joined Surrey in 2002 as Chief Superintendent to command West Surrey Basic Command Unit.  Previously (Guardian)

as a detective superintendent at the National Criminal Intelligence Service, he 'led on the national deployment of covert techniques to combat organised crime such as telephone interception' 

Rowley became Surrey Assistant Chief Constable from November 2003 and assumed the role of OOC for Operation Ruby in 2006.  He was appointed Chief Constable in 2009. Following the conviction of Levi Bellfield in 2011 for Millie Dowler's murder, Rowley iniated Operation Baronet under AC Jerry Kirkby.

Now:  Rowley is Assistant Commissioner at the MET. For some time he was direct superior officer of DAC Sue Akers command of Operations Weeting, Elveden and Tuleta.  Responsibility for these investigations was subsequently transferred to AC Cressida Dick.


PETER FAHY  (ACPO level)

Then: Throughout 2002, Fahy was Deputy Chief Constable of Surrey Police under Chief Constable Denis O'Connor. Fahy left Surrey in Dec '02 to become Chief Constable of Cheshire Police.

Now: Knighted in 2012, Sir Peter Fahy is currently Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police.

DENIS O'CONNOR  (ACPO level)

Then: In 2002, O'Connor was Chief Constable of Surrey Police. In all available evidence, O'Connor has been very keen to distance himself from the NOTW phone hacking in 2002.  Instead, he has consistently emphasized his heavy reliance on Peter Fahy's responsibility to have informed him:

You will understand that as a discipline authority, not everything reaches the Chief Constable, who must sit in judgment of things. So I may have been partially safe from it, but I would have expected and, you know,my sort of --my concern with the mission of policing and its credibility, that people would have drawn -- my senior staff, my professional standards department -- if there was anything significant, they would have told me... Particularly my Deputy Chief Constable at the present (sic) time, Peter Fahy, I had absolute faith in his integrity. I thought he would make the right judgments

Lord Justice Leveson did however challenge O'Connor on this strategy of continuing, unsighted insulation (pp 98-100).  His witness statement added (1st witness statement, p7):

I am not fully sighted on the details of the alleged contact between the News of the World and my staff during the Amanda Dowler investigation (I have deliberately limited my contact with Surrey Police pending current investigations) so cannot comment on the specifics of this issue.

Now:  Knighted in 2010, Sir Denis O'Connor is currently Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary.

And STILL there are inconsistencies emerging on the hacking of Millie Dowler. Note the investigation of Maria Woodall "rested on her actions and knowledge in 2007, when the first phone hacking convictions took place. It is clear that at that point she accessed the HOLMES system to view documents from 2002 associated with phone hacking."

Yet it is debatable just how much documentation was on the second generation HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) in 2002... or even in 2007. The - redacted - Sussex Review of September 2002 made Operational Recommendations:

Recommendation 56
That Surrey Police in general ensure that sufficient analysts are trained on the HOLMES 2 system.
Recommendation 57
That Surrey Police formulate an appropriate policy regarding the typing of at least the most significant 'other documents' onto HOLMES 2 during any enquiry.

Were those Sussex Police recommendations ignored? Or if significant 2002 Dowler phone hacking documents were in the HOLMES system, were they still there when Woodall looked in 2007? Had some disappeared by the time of the 2012 Operation Baronet?  Given that one of the aims of HOLMES is to facilitate crucial information access across force boundaries, was cross-force access to HOLMES 2002 documents volunteered by Surrey to Operation Caryatid (the MET 2005-6 investigation into Goodman and Mulcaire)? If not, why not?  Alternatively - following the high profile convictions of Goodman and Mulcaire in 2007 - Woodall may have tried to access cross-force MET HOLMES databases on NOTW phone hacking.

There were none. The MET did not enter details of the key Mulcaire Archive into HOLMES during the Operation Caryatid investigation in 2005. Or 2006. Or post-conviction in 2007.  It was only in July 2009, following intense criticism, that the MET's John Yates ordered the phone hacking data entry into HOLMES to enable victim notification. It was costly, protracted, and poorly executed.

The IPCC confirms "widespread knowledge uncovered in this investigation, we consider that it is scarcely credible that no one connected to the Milly Dowler investigation recognised the relevance and importance of the knowledge that Surrey Police had in 2002...There is no doubt, from our investigation and the evidence gathered by Operation Baronet, that Surrey Police knew in 2002 of the allegation that Milly Dowler’s phone had been hacked by the News of the World. It is apparent from the evidence that there was knowledge of this at all levels within the investigation team  ...former senior officers in particular appear to have been afflicted by a form of collective amnesia about this"

All this is highly reminiscent of the (contagious?) 'omerta' culture at the News of the World. Surrey Police seem to have demonstrated the self-same collective amnesia and willful blindness of NOTW senior executives, the plausible deniability of Andy Coulson, the trusting reliance on subordinates of Rupert Murdoch, the inability to read a log/email chain of James Murdoch, the document preservation abilities of News International's Datapool 3 team, and the reputational management skills of Colin Myler.

To date, six have been charged with conspiracy to intercept the voicemail messages of Millie Dowler in April 2002 - Rebekah Brooks, Andrew Coulson, Stuart Kuttner, Greg Miskiw, Neville Thurlbeck and Glenn Mulcaire.  Unless all six defendants plead guilty, these charges will have to be defended in open court. So there is much more evidence yet to emerge on the Dowler hacking, including the potential for former senior officers of Surrey Police being called as prosecution witnesses.

The short IPCC Commissioner's Report is a much-truncated and redacted version. The full IPCC formal Investigation Report "contains full details of the evidence supporting the findings and conclusions and the report into this case is not being published at this time at the request of the Crown Prosecution Service, in view of ongoing criminal proceedings."

This sorry Surrey saga is not over yet.


Related Articles
Hackgate - Springwatch
Hackgate - Elveden: Murdoch Or King Cnut?
Hackgate - Elveden - Murdoch's Catch 22
Hackgate - "Snakes And Ladders" At The Met
Hackgate - April Casburn's Conviction - Myths And Misconceptions
Hackgate - Varec Revisited - Dissent In The Ranks
Hackgate - Sue Akers' Swansong

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Varec Revisited - Dissent In The Ranks

The latest from my regular contributor.

Operation Varec is a little fuzzy round the edges.  It has its own formal 2010 inception date and terms of reference, but in some senses, it pre-dates that and grew out of John Yates' response to The Guardian article on the News of the World (NOTW) phone hacking, published July 8th 2009. This was Yates' 'Ratner moment' - undertaking a hasty fact-finding, presenting a same day, televised press statement, and later pronouncing on his own actions as "crap".

Lord Justice Leveson took the view that Yates could have, perhaps should have, excused himself from quasi-review of the phone hacking investigation - given his longstanding friendship with former NOTW executive, Neil Wallis.  Yet, even though his premature 'no new evidence, no re-investigation' press announcement was dismissive, should Yates accrue a little more credit?  After all, he didn't just let it drop there.

A series of meetings was convened by Yates over the next few months to establish if there were still skeletons in the closet of that original 2006 Goodman/Mulcaire investigation (Operation Caryatid).  Amongst those attending were DCS Phil Williams and DS Keith Surtees (investigating officers from 2006 operation), Steve Kavanagh (now sucessor to Sue Akers overseeing Operations Weeting, Elveden, Tuleta), DS Dean Haydon (Staff Officer to John Yates) and Sara Cheesley (Specialist Operations Press Desk, MET Directorate of Public Affairs).  The minutes of many of these are included as Exhibits to John Yates evidence to the Leveson Inquiry.  They seem characterised by a hyper-defensive mindset and a focus on presentational issues rather than evaluating the 2006 investigation.  Much effort was dedicated to developing responses to criticism of the Met from victims, government departments and Select Committee - reputational risk priortised perhaps at the expense of a more rigourous scrutiny of Operation Caryatid.  There is extensive background here in Sara Cheesley's witness statement to the Leveson Inquiry.

Recently, insights into those meetings have emerged which show a distinct lack of agreement on what action was needed - dissent in the ranks.  Tom Watson MP (3rd Dec 2012) raised this issue in the House of Commons:

May I draw his attention to a very late submission to the Leveson inquiry from Detective Chief Superintendent Surtees, which appeared on the (Leveson) website this week? He states that in July 2009, he argued internally that there was enough intelligence to warrant reopening the investigation into phone hacking. The hon. Gentleman will know that at no point was that raised with the Culture, Media and Sport Committee during its inquiry. That might be something that he and the Committee want to look at.  

Surtees 2nd Leveson witness statement (here) clearly spells out his trenchant view that the phone-hacking Investigation SHOULD be re-opened.  He says that he also suggested that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) be called in.

Surtees assertions are echoed by Phil Williams (here).

Both submissions appear to be tardy attempts to mitigate criticism of the investigating officers contained in the Leveson Report. Presumably, these MET-sanctioned statements were prompted by Section 13 letters.

On 1st September 2010, the New York Times published their exposé ' Tabloid Hack Attack on Royals, and Beyond'.  On the face of it, the article included new information, new informants, and new victims of phone hacking - including Andy Coulson who was then Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street.  Obviously, a disinterested and objective consideration of NOTW phone-hacking was again necessary.  This was a crucial point at which John Yates had another chance to step back, recuse himself, and request that the Commissioner task a different senior officer team without the baggage and closeness to NOTW.  However, Yates chose to have oversight of the new enquiries - Operation Varec - himself.  His own Staff Officer, Dean Haydon, was appointed Senior Investigating Officer (SIO).  Haydon had been closely associated with the 2009 scrutiny as a member (and minutes taker) of the Gold group meetings.

Started formally on 2nd September 2010, Varec's primary objective was

To assess whether allegations being made in the media since 1st September 2010 provided any new evidence of criminal offences, namely unlawful interception of communications, at News of the World, in 2005/6 

It has been alleged that, within ten days of Varec commencing, a senior MET officer contacted NOTW offering to supply information. (Daily Telegraph) The media stories addressed by Operation Varec covered the New York Times story, Guardian follow up, and the Channel 4 Dispatches October 2010 documentary 'Tabloids, Tories and Telephone Hacking'.  When Dean Haydon contacted The Guardian for information, Alan Rusbridger replied in a scathing email

Nick Davies was further able to reveal incontrovertible evidence of the involvement in phone hacking of other NoW reporters and executives: the material is sitting in your own files,... Seeking to obtain evidence from the Guardian should, it seems to us, be a matter of last resort for the police... But the fact that three separate news organizations have been able to uncover this story must give you hope that you, too, could get to the bottom of it without too much trouble   

Twenty one strands of inquiry by Operation Varec were followed, including:

• Asking the New York Times to supply names of their anonymous sources.  They declined.
• Interviewing ex-NOTW's Sean Hoare.  Contraversially, he was interviewed under caution and so refused to answer any questions. Another ex-NOTW journalist simply refused to speak with the police - let alone attend an interview.  
• Other NOTW executives and journalists were questioned about Operation Caryatid and refused to answer, denied any knowledge, or (on legal advice) submitted pre-prepared written statements.
• Anonymous allegations were received by the MET, implicating three NOTW journalists in phone hacking. Each was written to by Operation Varec requesting information. None of the three responded.
• Colin Myler, NOTW Editor, was asked to provide a list of journalists still employed since 2006 (in addition to those above).  Myler did so.  Every one of the list of 19 journalists was individually written to by Varec to ask for cooperation and interview.  Not a single one of the 19 even replied.

Unsurprisingly, Operation Varec came to the conclusion that they were unable to obtain any admissible evidence to warrant re-investigating phone- hacking at the News of the World. For details of the 21 investigatory strands, see here.

The genesis of Operation Varec still leaves some key questions unanswered:

• On the first opportunity to recuse himself from the 2009 quasi-review, why did John Yates not do so?
• On the second opportunity to recuse himself from the 2010 investigation, Operation Varec, why did John Yates not do so?
• Given the obduracy, obstructiveness and disregard shown by such a large number of former and serving NOTW journalists, why did the MET continue to collude with News International's thin veneer of cooperating with the police?

Assistant Commissioner Yates resigned on 18th July 2011.

Related Articles
Hackgate - Dacre's Dodgy Dossier - War Of Attrition 
Hackgate - Sue Akers' Swansong
Hackgate - "Newsdesk Here, Kelvin Speaking..."
Hackgate - Andre Baker - A Hackgate Footnote?
Hackgate - Ten To Watch For
Hackgate - Dear Surrey Police


You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Dacre's Dodgy Dossier - War Of Attrition

The latest piece from my regular contributor.

What on earth could have brought about The Mail's scatter-gun 'Dodgy Dossier'?  For a start, it's not even news...

13th July 2011
Way back, in the dim distant days before the Leveson (yes, there really was a time before Leveson...), Prime Minister David Cameron announced he was setting up a judge-led inquiry into press practices. Lord Justice Leveson was appointed to report to the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport. 

20th July 2011
The Prime Minister announced the Terms of Reference and appointment of “a panel of experts” to assist the Inquiry.  He named each of them and observed (Hansard, 20 July 2011, column 918): “These people have been chosen not only for their expertise in the media, broadcasting, regulation and policing, but for their complete independence from the interested parties.”  Ed Miliband too welcomed the Inquiry "and, indeed, the panel members chosen by the Prime Minister". Cameron praised cross-party agreement which had “worked well over the judicial inquiry, the panel, the terms of reference". (Hansard, 20 July 2011, column 918 onwards)  So it is clear that the Assessors were Prime Ministerial appointments, in consultation with two Secretaries of State, and with cross-party agreement. They were not appointees in Leveson's gift.

At that time, News International might have been the most apprehensive about the forthcoming Inquiry. Yet, arguably, Paul Dacre and Associated Newspapers Ltd (ANL) have proved the most challenging to Lord Justice Leveson. The Inquiry would hear evidence on ANL's past record with the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) when confronted with criticism - allegedly approximating string it out, object, delay, object some more, delay, go missing, too busy, fail to respond, object again.  Leveson may well have reflected later that this obdurate strategy was mirrored in ANL's dealings with him - the self-same modus operandi in macrocosm.

28th July 2011 
Leveson held an initial session and press conference to introduce himself, Assessors & Terms of Reference etc.  He also drew attention to the Inquiries Act, and its provision that any objections on Assessor appointments could be made within 14 days. None were made.

Summer 2011
Coordination, planning and procedural sessions continued on a variety of topics, including deciding who would have crucial Core Participant status. For example,
"Mr Mathieson of RPC repeated his position, identified in correspondence, that Associated Newspapers Ltd were minded to ask for core participant status but said that he was not in a position to do so in the absence of the Editor in Chief.  On other issues, he was without instructions." 

Pre-evidence discussion Seminars were scheduled  Mindful to include a range of experience and opinion, Leveson invited Paul Dacre to chair one of the Seminars: "I did ask him to participate. Unfortunately, on 6th October he cannot, and I am waiting to hear from him about the 12th, I understand."

26th August 2011
ANL wrote to Leveson, questioning the role and remit of the Assessor function, and challenging three of the six Assessors - Sir David Bell (here), George Jones (here), and Elinor Goodman (here).

In addition, ANL complained that the panel of Assessors lacked balance as none had tabloid or mid-market newspaper experience (oddly overlooking Elinor Goodman's freelancing for ANL's own Mail on Sunday).  Written exchanges continued with ANL adding concerns about Inquiry strategies they considered political partisanship for good measure.  Letters, submissions, maneuvering rumbled on all summer, delaying and distracting from the main business of the new Inquiry, leading to this revealing exchange:

MR CAPLAN: I am sure you will understand that Associated Newspapers, whom I represent, do not in any way wish to be confrontational with the Inquiry, but you will also understand of course --

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The letters didn't quite read like that.

 Leveson made a salient point about ANL's argument that long experience of working with tabloids should be the prime criterion for balance of Assessors.  If so, he suggested, it "would have been open to them (the Ministers) or to me to appoint, for example, Mr Mulcaire.  He has expertise."  (ANL Oral Arguments)  Far from being swatted away dismissively, Leveson mustered the patience of a saint to give ANL's objections due consideration.

17th October 2011
Leveson's formal Ruling reiterated any appeal against Assessors would have needed to be promptly addressed to the Ministers who appointed them not Leveson himself, and that he was satisfied with their relevance and integrity.  By this point, it should be remembered, the Inquiry evidence Hearings hadn't even begun. Finally in mid-November the Evidence Hearings started. But by Day 2, ANL's Opening Submission again set an uncompromising tone.  There were three main issues raised: the absolute necessity of press self-regulation, objections to anonymous witnesses, and - red rag to Dacre's bull - ANL's asserted innocence re Operation Motoman. (for background see here)

21st November 2012
Hugh Grant gave evidence.  That evening, "Paul Dacre, the Associated Newspapers editor-in-chief, had a hand in the drafting of the Daily Mail publisher's statement accusing Hugh Grant of "mendacious smears" (Guardian) 

Who can forget the interminable arguments in Court 73 twixt ANL and Mr Sherborne..?

2nd December 2011
Leveson held a closed session with Core Participant counsel to discuss the general treatment of Operation Motorman materials. A consensus was reached that there was prima facie evidence of newspaper 'bulk users' illegalities.  On condition of that collective consensus, Leveson proposed not to make the Motorman files public.

2012 dawned. Perhaps New Year's resolutions would bring peace and goodwill...

13th January 2012
Application for Judicial Review

High Courts of Justice, Case No: CO/11362/2011:
Before LORD JUSTICE TOULSON, MR JUSTICE SWEENEY and MRS JUSTICE SHARP
 Between: (Claimant)
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LIMITED
- and -
(Defendant) THE RT HON LORD JUSTICE LEVESON (AS CHAIRMAN OF THE LEVESON INQUIRY)

In short, ANL applied for permission of overrule Leveson on allowing anonymised witness evidence from those fearful of victimisation.  ANL opined that Leveson would thereby be trampling on natural justice, risked causing them reputational damage, and trangressed their section 10 Human Rights.  Mr Justice Toulson declined...

...to micromanage the conduct of the Inquiry by the Chairman... (I) refuse this application for judicial review. For the future,...protocol will be matters of detailed consideration for him, which should not foreseeably give rise to further requests for judicial interference.

Mr Justice Sweeney: I agree.   

Mrs Justice Sharp:  I also agree.

The week scheduled for evidence from Editors was inconvenient for Dacre - again.  Robert Jay reported, ...

some people may be wondering why Mr Paul Dacre is not on the list for today. The answer is he's not available for the rest of this month, and indeed for today, but we have lined him up, as it were, for 6 February

6th February 2012
Dacre's first appearance. Duly sworn-in, Leveson welcomed him: "Mr Dacre, I thank you, as I've thanked the editors of other newspapers who have allowed me to visit their newsrooms. I know you weren't there at the time but I'm grateful to you for allowing me to do so"

Asked by Robert Jay if complainants to the PCC were commonly worn down by a protracted ANL 'war of attrition', Dacre categorically denied it (p45).  When questioned closely on Motorman and use of Steve Whittamore, Dacre became obstinate and combative.  He refused to accept ANL's titles might have been complicit in illegality so Leveson called a short break to allow him to consult Counsel.  On return Dacre was hardly pacified, asserting that whilst Whittamore may have done illegal acts ANL journalists had demonstrably not. (p57)

Because of the spat over Hugh Grant and the 'mendacious smear' allegation - Leveson directed that Dacre return for a second appearance.  Mr Caplan QC first argued against Dacre having to appear again, and then seemed to prevaricate as to whether Dacre would even comply. The exchanges are interesting:

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We, of course, as you know, fitted in to Mr Dacre's timetable....  We WILL find some short period of time for this to be the subject of further evidence and we shall do that this week. And there it is.
MR CAPLAN: Sir, I obviously will have to make enquiries of --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
MR CAPLAN: I have no idea of Mr Dacre's whereabouts.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Caplan, I'm very sorry. I know that Mr Dacre is busy. We have worked very hard to fit ourselves around his commitments. I cannot believe that in the next three days it is not possible to find a few minutes. We shall fit ourselves around him to such extent as we can but I beg you not to ask me to go further. 

(for more, see The Motorman Files and Dacre's Dilemma)

9th February 2012
Required to give that encore appearance (and clearly there grudgingly), yet another Dacre robust defence was prompted re Grant's "mendacious smears" - and a testy 11 page Supplemental Statement.



14th June 2012
ANL's counsel wrote to the Inquiry and, arguably, reneged on the consensus understood to be have been reached that the Motorman files demonstrated prima facie offences by press journalists.

18th June 2012
The Mail splashed its story alleging that Leveson had threatened to resign, was stifling free speech, and had clashed with Michael Gove's right-minded defence of press liberty.


19th June 2012
A seeming Motorman-related Submission from ANL on 'Standard of Proof', challenging Lord Justice Leveson. (here)

In ANL’s submission the issues to be considered are as follows:
(1) Whether it is open to the Chairman to express concerns based on suspicion?
(2) If so, in what circumstances, including, whether the grounds giving rise to the suspicion must be reasonable grounds or whether a lower standard of proof is acceptable, having regard to the duty of fairness?
(3) Whether it is fair or appropriate when dealing with allegations of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature for the Chairman to state that he finds such allegations proved on the civil standard?

10th July 2012
Leveson's measured response, via written Ruling - addressed solely to ANL - was that he considered "it would not be appropriate to reach a conclusion about the Whittamore material that one of the most significant core participants (and one of the largest users of Mr Whittamore’s services) wished to challenge without deploying that evidence in public" (p8)  So, Leveson was being very clear that he could and would put selected Motorman evidence into the public domain. As just ANL were recanting, he was prepared to arrange that only Motorman files exclusively linked to ANL titles would be made public.  To reinforce the point, he was happy to order the necessary additional public Hearings in August.  It did not sound as though Leveson was making an empty threat.

13th July 2012
ANL backed down by apologising for any misunderstanding: "It was not our intention to resile from the position confirmed on a confidential basis to the Inquiry in December 2011." (see here)

Lord Justice Leveson and Mr Jay QC must have given sighs of relief.... prematurely.

20th July 2012
ANL Closing Submission, (p41)

ANL also remains concerned that one of the Assessors who will be assisting the Chairman in his task is the former chairman of the Media Standards Trust, whose proposals for regulation - opposed by ANL and other publishers - include a proposed regulatory "backstop"

23rd July 2012Future Directions Ruling (here).  Amongst other observations, Leveson returned to Operation Motorman.  One outstanding issue he identified was "concerning the attitude of Associated Newspapers Ltd to the evidence revealed in the documentation seized from the private detective Steve Whittamore."  He reported back publicly ANL's letter apologising for any misunderstanding on the Motorman evidence.  Leveson also reminded that Mr Sherborne (Counsel for Core Participant Victims) was in the process of collating information on journalists named in the Motorman files who were still in continuous employment with the relevant titles. This exercice was to determine if those journalists had been rewarded by promotion or had perhaps retained data obtained from Whittamore.  Once presented, Leveson required responses from the newspapers by 10th September.  at time of writing, only one of those responses has been made public on the Inquiry web site - from ANL.

7th Sept 2012
Two days before the deadline, ANL sent the Inquiry 'Witness Statement from ANL re Steve Whittamore data'.  It suggested that the Inquiry misunderstood the organic, perhaps haphazard, nature of working journalists collection and retention of people's personal data that they procured.  ANL considered it disproportionate to search for and collate this "low grade" personal information, failed to name any journalists, and said they did not realise that Leveson actually required a response to his request made to Dacre as the Inquiry team had omitted to remind them.

16th November 2012
Safely past the cut-off date which may have risked another Leveson admonishment, Dacre launched his 'Dodgy Dossier' fusillade. Obviously unused to not getting his own way, the 'Special Investigation' targeted Leveson's questionable associates, raising "disturbing questions"  of the "quasi-masonic nexus" of "an elite" of "People-Who-Know-Best". (Dossier here)

What could have provoked Dacre's itchy trigger finger?  Well, there is one thing left out of our timeline as we don't know the 'if' or 'when'.  It is a requirement that Lord Justice Leveson write, giving notice and inviting response, to anyone he intends to criticise in his Final Report.

Hmmmm.... could it be that Dacre's Mail have had a Section 13 letter from Lord Justice Leveson? 

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com