Blue Chips And The New SOCA Dossier - What The Media Missed

The latest from my regular contributor.

Yes, it is quite clear that getting information from SOCA is like pulling teeth.

So many questions and loose ends. Wouldn't it be interesting to know more about what offences are in dispute? have SOCA really been liaising with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) or not? Who's been sitting on what information, for how long, and why? Wouldn't some more clarity on Project Riverside (here) be informative? Who knew what when about Operation Millipede and the 'blue chip' list? What was the sequence of contacts between SOCA and Metropolitan Police Service (MET) about Millipede? And also Operation Tuleta? (For background on Millpede and Tuleta see here).

Considering the recent press 'revelations' and 'outrage' over blue chips, it is remarkable that there is so little interest in the detail of these key questions. Or, in many cases, bothering with accuracy.

What would help, presumably, is if SOCA were to release into the public domain its answers to these key questions. Say, a 14 page dossier of responses to criticisms with detailed timelines etc etc.

It has. You can read it (here).

But apparently there's no interest from the mainstream press, despite them calling for answers for weeks. Baffling, isn't it?

THE SOCA DOSSIER

Firstly, SOCA reports there is NO blue chip 'hacking' scandal as yet uncovered. And the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) is at pains to agree. This flies in the face of what has been reported in the Telegraph, Daily Mail, Independent, Daily Mirror etc - and even the Financial Times. Reasons for this lack of accuracy might be speculated upon - ranging from inaccurate research or wishful thinking to sheer bloody minded ideological obstinancy. A wilful assertion of blue chip 'hacking' doesn't make it fact, but does mobilise a narrative skewed towards journalists being picked on and victimised.

The SOCA report to HASC says:

There has been some confused reporting over these matters in the media over the past few weeks...the clients of the private investigators convicted as a result of Operation Millipede have been characterised by some sections of the media as 'blue chip hacking'. However, it is important to note that the main focus of Operation Millipede was around the use of 'blagging'. There are different legislative penalties available to investigators and a lack of particularly dissuasive penalties for 'blagging' under the Data Protection Act, as opposed to 'hacking'.

Offences to do with 'hacking' are different to those associated with 'blagging', and different to those convictions for Operation Millipede which were for 'fraud' - which is why accuracy is preferable to muddle.

ANNEX B: 

"PROJECT RIVERSIDE TIMELINE"

SOCA denies Riverside has "suppressed" blue chip 'hacking' and provide a detailed timeline (Annex B) which includes the dates that the Riverside intelligence report was shared with The MET, Home Office ICO and Leveson Inquiry. Operations Flandria and Gloxinia were focused on intelligence other than 'blue chip', and it is fair to assume some sections of the press were already well aware of the associated trajectories of Operation Abelard II and Operation Caryatid (the original 06-07 News of the World phone-hacking investigation). Press characterising "suppression" must therefore emanate from Operation Millipede rather than Project Riverside?

ANNEX C: 

"TIMELINE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH INFORMATION COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE IN RESPECT OF OPERATION MILLIPEDE."

Operation Millipede was widely reported at the time of convictions, including both identified blue chip names and further alleged links to News international - itself a blue chip corporate. Undoubtedly, where SOCA can be criticised is for its tardiness in collating a structured list of corporate Millipede clients. 

The ICO appear to have been formally involved and informed early in Millipede, even before arrests were made. There were consultations on offences to be prosecuted with both ICO and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) particularly bearing in mind lack of public interest defence and the history of paltry sentences for Data Protection Act offences per se. There seems to have been a formal understanding and division of labour on Millipede: SOCA would progress Private Investigators prosecutions then provide ICO with the Millipede evidence to follow up and evaluate potential CLIENT prosecutions. Client prosecutions have never been ruled out - this is confirmed by ICO evidence in the public domain (see here).

And, with the imminent publication of the blue chip list by HASC, the ICO may be best placed to use that precedent to release the Motorman Files too.

ANNEX D: 

"TIMELINE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE ON OPERATIONS MILLIPEDE and TULETA"

Where both SOCA and MET can be criticised is perhaps in their failures to be clear about their division of labour, and why Millipede evidence was not passed to the ICO sooner. SOCA's intentions to pass Millpede to the ICO were altered in light of the launch of Operation TULETA. Tuleta (and sub-operation Kalmyk) involve very serious alleged offences - these were perceived as having precedence over lesser DPA infringements. That should have been made explicit to ICO and indeed Home Affairs Select Committee. This understandable but badly communicated decision has led to perceptions of cover up.

WHAT NEXT?

• Kick-started by HASC, SOCA has belatedly drawn up a structured list of Millipede clients.
• The ICO has now received Millipede evidence and will begin evaluating whether or not there is sufficient evidence that Millipede private investigator corporate 'blue chip' clients were aware of illegalities used on their behalf.
• The MET continues to investigate alleged email hacking and other offences under Operation Tuleta.
• There were 107 corporate clients on the 'blue chip' Millipede list given to HASC. Keith Vaz (HASC Chair) proposes 102 of those corporate clients be publicly named

The discrepancy in the numbers? That is because 5 client company identities have been redacted and witheld at the insistence of the MET for operational reasons. Those 5 are currently under investigation by Operation Tuleta which may potentially lead to serious corporate prosecutions. Those are the 5 to watch.

The latest news is that SOCA is still refusing to publish the blue chip list, and is supported in that stance by the MET. SOCA and MET reiterate the potential damage to on-going operations in a fluid and changing context. For example, "since SOCA provided the lists of 102 clients to the Committee on 22 July 2013, the MPS have identified a further four crossovers with MPS operations other than Operation Tuleta." (here)

None of which excuses the press itself for failing to cover the 14 page public dossier already presented to HASC. Why the deafening silence? Like Ouroboros eating its own tail, will the mainstream press now accuse itself of "suppression" and cover-up?

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Witness Protection, Anyone?

The latest from my regular contributor.

"The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry and Others Unlawfully Trading in Personal Data"

The first version Serious Organised Crime Agency report (2008) was made public in July 2012. It said (p5) there was evidence that private investigators were
(c) accessing details of current investigations against a criminal or criminal group;
(h) attempting to discover location of witnesses

A second version SOCA report (2008) was published July 2013. That version gave more detail, stating private investigators were also (p6)

(j) attempting to discover identity of CHlSes; (Covert Human Intelligence Sources)
(l) attempting to discover location of witnesses under police protection to intimidate them:

July 2nd 2013
The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) took evidence from SOCA's Chair SIR IAN ANDREWS and Director General TREVOR PEARCE. (transcript here)

HASC Chair Keith Vaz cited recent press reports brought to the Committee's attention: "We have also read that private investigators were hired by criminal gangs to infiltrate the witness protection programme... there are criminal acts that have taken place here. The breaking into the witness protection programme is a pretty serious issue.

Trevor Pearce: Other than seeing in the media reporting, I have never heard anything formerly. As a law enforcement officer who has had some significant engagement with the undercover world and the protected persons’ world, I have not heard of that before."

July 9th 2013 
HASC took evidence from Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) CRESSIDA DICK. Nicola Blackwood MP asked about the security and integrity of the MET witness protection programme given press reports of breaches by corrupt private investigators, as mentioned in the 2008 SOCA Report. CRESSIDA DICK responded by clarifying that the SOCA Report was a "strategic analysis of MET material". so it gave nothing to the MET by way of NEW information. She said however that the MET Directorate of Professional Standards and Witness Protection were "highly alert to the media coverage." A scoping exercice is currently underway. Though it was "not surprising serious organised criminals" might attempt to access information on those in witness protection, "we have not had any examples."

"There is risk..., intelligence sometimes that they are seeking to do so...(but) we are not aware of anything in the Metropolitan Police of infiltration of witness protection."

SOCA REPORT SOURCE MATERIAL
The SOCA strategic analysis utilised five indicative serious crime investigations, plus incorporated intelligence from the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) investigation Operation MOTORMAN. (for background see here)

There was a joint Devon and Cornwall Police/ICO raid at the premises of private investigator John BOYALL which revealed that he and another private investigator - Steve WHITTAMORE- were both engaged in illegal data procurement (here).

The seizure included evidence of attempted access to extremely confidential material, according to ICO investigating officer Alex Owens (p4 here):

One VRM (Vehicle Registraion Mark) particular was of great concern to me because clearly written alongside it was ’Protected Number’; Having served within Special Branch during my Police service I knew this particular VRM must relate to a very sensitive individual or operation within the Police. This was subsequently confirmed to me by the Metropolitan Police although I requested no detail.

Boyall sold information on as he was "Sub-contracted to supply information to Stephen Whittamore. Whittamore, Boyall, King and Marshall (Operation Glade) were charged with conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. Boyall and Whittamore were later charged with obtaining information contrary to s55 of the DPA 1998 and received conditional discharge 15.4.05." (p213 here)

OPERATION CARYATID
One of the five serious crime investigations assessed by SOCA was Operation CARYATID which had resulted in custodial sentences for Clive GOODMAN and private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The Investigating Officer (IO) Keith Surtees described the initial handling of the chaotic Mulcaire papers seized on his arrest (p50 here)

I don't recognise a notebook, because I don't recall actually finding one or seeing one. I do recall lots of loose-leaf A4 pieces of paper, as I've said, with various stages of research on, and I think I refer to that within this decision. I see that through the process of -- I think it's probably from August 9, 10 (2006) onwards. I firstly negotiate a group of officers, I think somewhere in the region of 20 or 30 officers, who I negotiate because they're not anti-terrorist branch officers because they're all busy doing Operation Overt and everything else. They're Special Branch officers, they're vetted to the highest level, and it's those officers, I negotiate their overtime, because they're working through weekends when they should be off, and they work through I think for a period of five to seven days to go through all of the documentation, and with that they're briefed by me at the beginning around what I want them to do with that in the first instance, which is to ascertain whether there's anything to undermine or assist the police case with regard to Goodman and Mulcaire, because by then we've charged both Goodman and Mulcaire and my obligations under CPIA kick in

THE MET GIVES EVIDENCE
A flawed victim notification policy was challenged later, in September 2011, when there was the Judicial Review -

THE QUEEN on the application of (Claimants) ,CHRIS BRYANT MP, BRIAN PADDICK, LORD PRESCOTT, 'HJK', BEN JACKSON
and the COMMISSIONER of the POLICE of the METROPOLIS (Defendant)

The claimants alleged the MET had failed to notify them that they had been phone hacking targets of private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The MET's Mark Maberly was required to give a statement in evidence. He had been Case Officer of the original investigation into Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire - Operation CARYATID. Maberly's statement said (para 50)

On 23rd November 2006 a report was produced by the Directorate of Professional Standards which detailed the results of the examination of the computers and other storage media recovered during the original searches. The report would have been collected shortly after. Included within the report was a computerised address and phonebook of contacts including potential targets. The contents of the report were brought to the attention of the Investigating Officer Keith Surtees. Following on from receipt of this report and in consultation with the SIO, DC Green and I met with an officer from the witness protection unit. There was concern that within the contents of the report were the details of persons who were given new identities as part of a witness protection programme. Those in the programme would include both witnesses and defendants to high profile serious crime. I provided the list for him to view and it quickly became apparent that contained within were names of interest to him. I provided him with a copy of the report to take away. I had no further contact with this officer about the report or the details contained within.

Keith Surtees' evidence to Leveson concurred (p72-73 here):

MR JAY: There were names though in the project list, as it were, that according to Detective Sergeant Maberly were on the witness protection programme. Is that something you knew about?
A. Yes. It was brought to my attention that some names here within this document may well have been from the witness protection programme. What I instructed DS Maberly to do was to contact the witness protection unit, get them to come across to our office, show them the document, get them to look at it, and if there were any risks to people they were protecting, take whatever mitigation they needed to take to protect them. I didn't ask or seek information from the witness protection people around the quantity or individual details of who --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not individual details, but weren't you interested to know whether it was in fact the case?
A. I knew it was the case on some of them because it was quite obvious it was the case.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Didn't that itself create an enormous issue for you? This must be among some of the most confidential information that's held.
A. Yes, and the officer from the witness protection unit was best placed to take whatever remedial action needed to be taken in regards to that. In terms of the provenance of the information, that also concerned me, yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you didn't do anything about that.
A. I had conversations throughout May, June, July and August in terms of the investigation. I had conversations August, September, October, November with regards to the various drips of information that were coming through, and briefed those up.
Q But in that context, if the conspiracy was limited to Goodman and Mulcaire, there would be concern but there wouldn't be enormous concern, but if the conspiracy went wider, as you suspected it did, to others at News International, that concern would be multiplied, wouldn't it, in relation to possible prejudice to those on the witness protection programme?
A. Witness protection programme, access to government ministers, access to military, right across. There were lots and lots of concerns, yes, including the witness protection issues, yes. 

CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, this seems to be the chain of communications:

- Metropolitan Police Service SPECIALIST OPERATIONS undertook the original phone hacking investigation - Operation CARYATID - into Goodman and Mulcaire.

- The CARYATID Team borrowed a crew of expensive SPECIAL BRANCH officers with elite Developed Vetting status to undertake a preliminary sift and summary of the Mulcaire papers.

- The resultant summaries revealed that multiple, highly sensitive witness information had been compromised. That sensitive information was communicated to the WITNESS PROTECTION UNIT by the Investigating Officer, who also briefed it up through SPECIALIST OPERATIONS.

- Then the MET provided SOCA with extensive information on the Goodman/Mulcaire investigation for strategic assessment. SOCA undertook its crucial risk analysis , including CARYATID and MOTORMAN, and circulated their restricted Report to key senior policy-makers and agencies.

- The MET was provided with the SOCA Report in Feb 2008. The Director General of SOCA believes it would have gone to the Directorate of Professional Standards and/ or to the Deputy Commissioner.

But five years later, in 2013, neither SOCA nor current ACSO MET SPECIALIST OPERATIONS have ever heard of any private investigator compromising highly secret witness protection data. And that is despite two senior (still serving) officers giving very public evidence twice - to the Judicial Review and to the Leveson Inquiry.

Hackgate has certainly prompted senior rank resignations at the MET. But this can only partially account for the apprently poor 'corporate memory'.

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Project Riverside And The SOCA Report

The latest from my regular contributor.

Last weekend, the Independent published a genuine scoop - 'The Other Hacking Scandal' (here)

Tom Harper obtained and reported on the full and unredacted version of the 2008 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) report on 'Project Riverside'. It collated and detailed five investigations uncovering serious illegalities by 'rogue element' private investigators. The Indy's scoop triggered a chain reaction amongst some of Harper's fellow journalists seeking to blame Leveson for keeping them in the dark.

They are outraged - outraged, I tell you - that LJ Leveson failed infinitely to expand the remit given to him by the Prime Minister. Obviously, he should have included corporate, legal and insurance abusers of illegal data harvesting and blagging via dodgy private investigators. Leveson had surely headed a conspiracy to suppress the SOCA report - 'Private Investigators: The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry and Others Unlawfully Trading in Personal Data' (public version here).

The use by corporate and law firm clients of private investigators must have been deliberately suppressed and kept "secret" because no victimised and maligned journalists had ever heard of such things before 2013. The 'powers that be' must have connived for years in the cover-up for fear the press would wield their trusty sword of truth to expose these shocking malpractices. How dare 'they' conspire to keep it all out of the public domain?

Time for police and politicians to get stuck into phone hackers big time, says @TonyParsonsUK http://t.co/ssAkxdLE08
— David Wooding (@DavidWooding) June 29, 2013

Front Page of @HuffPostUK: Why Did Leveson, Politicians & Police Bury the Real Scandal of the 'Other Hacking' Report? http://t.co/R3D1112Iph
— Neil Wallis (@neilwallis1) June 24, 2013

How about a £20 million enquiry into fatcat phone hackers? End the harassment of our free press NOW http://t.co/HAKDEQSLBM via @DailyMirror
— Tony Parsons (@TonyParsonsUK) June 29, 2013

Over the years perhaps the press could have, er.... read some of the media reports?

1997 

Santha Rasaiah of the Newspaper Society sent to the then Director of the PCC, Guy Black, a copy of a 1997 case in which a Rachel Barry, a former private investigator, had been convicted at Harrow Magistrates Court on 28 October 1997 of a total of 12 offences of procuring the disclosure of personal data and of selling the information procured, in contravention of s.5(6) and s.5(7) of the Data Protection Act. The report of the case in the Data Protection Registrar claimed that the clients of Ms Barry had included the proprietors of the News of the World, the People, the Sunday Express and the Mail on Sunday.  (p357 here)

Ah... problematic. It would have been a little difficult to front page splash on the private investigator's corporate, legal and insurance clients without implicating the press too, I guess.

1998-99 

"Corrupt detective selling information to criminals and private detectives" (Guardian, here) .

He was convicted for "obtaining information from the police computer and sabotaging numerous court cases.... (aiding) professional criminals in the south London area to avoid capture and evade charges by providing them with information about police investigations.......the IRA, driving offences, drugs, anything,"
'The information he provided was invaluable,' says Mick, a one-time armed robber...He would be able to tell you what statements the police had obtained, who they had interviewed, which properties were under surveillance, which phones were being tapped - the lot. Worth its weight in gold. You would pay between £5,000 and £10,000 a time, but it was well worth it.'

2002

A news report about illegal data gathering by private investigators for business rivals: "The two-year inquiry unearthed evidence that a police officer had illegally tapped information from a protected database was sparked by a row between two prominent businessmen." (here)

Plus, there were categorically no journalists implicated: "The investigation found no evidence that any media organisation was involved in the obtaining of the data." The chain of private investigators could apparently access information on targets "which could include details of their criminal background, their financial situation, medical history~ telephone records and current whereabouts. The originating customers ranged from individuals involved in matrimonial matters up to multi nationa! financial institutions looking to obtain information in relation to a range of civil matters." (pages 9-10 here)

But that 2002 investigation, Operation Reproof, collapsed before trial so suspects were not convicted - including John BOYALL and Christopher DEWSE.

Wait a minute - those names are familiar. John BOYALL (see here) and Christopher DEWSE (see here).  I think I remember - weren't both implicated in the 2003-4 Operation Motorman investigation into journalists' use of private investigators? (see here)

2006

(WPP?) What Price Privacy? (here) and (WPPN?) What Price Privacy Now? (here)

A substantial amount of the material found in the 2008 SOCA Report (redacted for public, version published 2012) can be found in these two Information Commissioner's Office 2006 reports, including extracts from the notorious 'Blagger's Manual'.

As Operation Motorman begat Operation Glade, it's not surprising that WPP? and the SOCA Project Riverside report concurred on the 5 culprit groups:

2006 WPP? p16

On the demand side, the customers come from the following main groups:

- the media, especially newspapers

- insurance companies

- lenders and creditors, including local authorities chasing council tax arrears 

- parties involved in matrimonial and family disputes

- criminals intent on fraud, or seeking to influence jurors, witnesses or legal personnel.

2008 SOCA Project Riverside Report

The clients of private investigators can be categorised mainly, but not exclusively as follows:

a. domestic – persons seeking to discover activities of their partners, mainly in matrimonial and family proceedings;

b. debt recovery tracing – seeking to discover the locations of debtors;

c. insurance claims – loss adjusters investigating the veracity of claims;

d. media – seeking material for “scoops” about high profile figures;

e. criminal fraternity – the frustration of law enforcement.

The Brown Moses blog addressed the redacted SOCA 'Project Riverside' report here.

WPP? notes that a "private investigator had been engaged by a potentially abusive husband to track down his estranged wife" and "Among the individuals whose privacy had been violated was a woman who had been involved as a vital prosecution witness in a prolonged police enquiry...(which) raised the spectre of possible witness intimidation or harassment."

Yet the accusation remains that the powers-that-be did nothing. Nothing - but only if you don't count the detailing of another 26 prosecutions cited in WPP? for 2002-06. Or several other well-publicised examples since its publication in 2006. Or even after the SOCA report intelligence cut-off date of 30/09/2007.

2006

SHARON and STEPHEN ANDERSON were

used by many City law firms acting for companies engaged in financial disputes or credit checks... the couple's activities can be linked to prominent law firms Arnold & Porter and Mishcon de Reya... and a large US insurance firm.

(source)

2007

HACKERS 'R' US and LIVE TELEPHONE INTERCEPTS

There was this case too - involving the founder of Jimmy Choo shoe empire a and high profile waste disposal business proprietor. (here)

They also had a lucrative sideline involving hacking into people's computers and tapping into their phones... Interception specialist Michael Hall installed hi-tech devices in BT junction boxes and overhead telephone wires to monitor the phone calls of its clients' business rivals or spouses.

This was Operation Barbatus.

2007-09

A SOCA investigation dubbed Operation Millipede resulted in four convictions for offences totally unconnected to the press - another network operating for corporate clients including foreign exchange dealers and property developers. (here)  Some shady private investigation companies are notorious for changing their names though. (see here, 'SOUTHERN INVESTIGATIONS - What's in a Name')

Deliberately obscuring associations, past histories, questionable directorships and so on can be achieved through liberal use of name changes, 'trading as' designations with different bank accounts, and deploying almost (but not quite) identical company names which are distinct legal entities. Just as an example, from Operation Millipede above, one company was said to be owned by convicted MET-detective-turned-private-investigator Adam John SPEARS. By the time of his arrest though SPEARS had ceased to be a director of that company, 'GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES LTD'.

[And - just in case any powers-that-be are reading - it should be clearly noted that 'GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES LTD' have absolutely no apparent connection to the coincidentally very, very similarly named company 'GLOBAL INTEL SERVICES LTD' or to its unimplicated directors - Alison and Glenn MULCAIRE.(here)]

Oh.

2012

Channel 4 Dispatches: 'Watching the Detectives'

"Several minutes into their first meeting, the director of Crown Intelligence offers an undercover reporter a broad range of highly sensitive and potentially illegal personal data... An undercover reporter, posing as a risk analysis company representing multinationals, approached private investigators requesting background information on political activists they claimed were targeting clients... A hidden camera monitors STEPHEN ANDERSON leaning across his desk in a plush office near Hyde Park, central London, saying: "I could go through his criminal history, his financial history, bank accounts, loans, medical history." (here)

[ That name seems familiar..? ]

2012

The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) held evidence sessions on 'Private Investigators'. The Committee was "presented with evidence that links private investigators with serving police officers, in a case that demonstrates the close involvement of investigators with the justice system. GMB described evidence that 'confidential information from police files has been leaked to the Consulting Association (headed by a private investigator)' including notes on people’s presence at demonstrations and records of contacts with the police." (Ev25)

The HASC Report (here) even revealed (Ev82) possible links to the murder of Daniel Morgan: "In response to our follow-up inquiries with Commander Spindler, we received a recall of historic cases known to the Directorate of Professional Standards Intelligence Bureau, including Operation Barbatus, Operation Two Bridges and Operation Abelard." (for more background, see here).  Following the Independent scoop, HASC Chair Keith Vaz has called a new evidence session on Tuesday July 2nd - "Committee to question the Serious Organised Crime Agency on Private Investigators" (here)

All credit to Tom Harper and the Independent - the new HASC session would not be happening without their sound investigative journalism.

The Indy also reported that former News of the World deputy editor Neil Wallis said:

Until the Independent told me about this, I had not the slightest clue of the scale of illegal information theft going on among our supposedly respectable professions.

Related Articles
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Hackgate - Alex Marunchak - Presumed Innocent
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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Andre Baker - A Hackgate Footnote?

The latest from my regular contributor.

Readers of these Brown Moses posts on Hackgate may remember a recent post - 'News Corp - Diplomatic Immunity?' It offered a different perspective regarding politicians subjected to News International 'dark arts' - shifting the focus from WHO to WHAT Offices of State they held at the time they were allegedly hacked, burgled or put under surveillance. This current article is an experiment in doing the reverse - shifting the focus from WHAT law enforcement office was held to WHO?

The starting point is a small gathering in a side office at Scotland Yard - convened to confront Rebekah Wade and ask why the News of the World (NOTW) had apparently undertaken surveillance of a Metropoltan Police (MET) officer investigating the barbaric axe murder of Daniel Morgan.   At the meeting were Rebekah Wade, Dick Federcio, the MET officer himself Dave Cook, and Cook's boss Commander Andre Baker.

But WHO is Andre BAKER?  And what are his connections to the complex Hackgate saga?

Andre (Andy) BAKER has had a lengthy career in the MET.  He joined in 1975 and rose through the ranks in posts throughout London, including notoriously tough beats in South East London around Lewisham, Eltham and Catford. 

October 2001 He was promoted to the rank of Commander, Serious Crime Directorate (Homicide). As such, he would have been well aware that three previous investigations into Daniel Morgan's murder had been abortive, and that one of those investigations had involved MET bugging conversations of suspects (Operation Nigeria) - eavesdropping on apparently corrupt procurement of information by NOTW.

21 March 2002  Milly Dowler disappeared from Walton-on-Thames.  Surrey Police started their abduction - then murder - inquiry.  The MET Serious Crime (Homicide) - under Commander Andre BAKER - liaised closely with Surrey Police in case Milly's murder might be linked to suspects in other London murder investigations.

It is not known if Surrey Police at that time apprised Andre BAKER and his team that NOTW had hacked Milly Dowler's phone.  If Surrey Police did, then this knowledge would have added considerably to Commander BAKER's growing intelligence on the 'dark arts' and NOTW.

25 June 2002  Detective Chief Superintendent Dave Cook appeared on BBC Crimewatch to appeal for any information on the murder of Daniel Morgan.

10 July 2002  Cook noted an unfamiliar parked van outside his home. It tailed him whilst he drove his children to school. His then wife, Jacqui Hames, later noticed photographs of their house being taken surreptitiously from a parked vehicle. Further investigations by fellow MET officers are alleged to have connected NotW to this covert surveillance.  The MET were concerned enough to give the Cook-Hames family witness protection status and additional security.



9 January 2003  The confrontation at Scotland Yard.   Dick Fedorcio arranged the meeting, at the request of Andre BAKER.  As Fedorcio described it (Evidence to the Leveson Inquiry p54)

Commander Baker was doing it because of his concerns about Mr Cook's concerns, really. It wasn't about taking any action against the News of the World; it was to help Mr Cook understand and come to terms with what had gone on. That was how Commander Baker described to me, as a welfare meeting, looking after a member of his staff

At a subsequent Metropolitan Police Authority meeting (the then MET oversight body) in 2011, a Member understandably asked why (MPA: Strategic and Operational Policing Committee minutes -14-Jul-11 p4)

... no further action was taken. He asked: first, who took the decision to proceed in that way - a conversation with the editor but no further action - and were then Commissioner or Deputy involved or informed? Secondly, were any other senior officers involved or informed? And finally, would John Yates' team who reinvestigated the Daniel Morgan murder have known?

The MPA were advised by the MET Acting Commissioner that no public response could be made as the Cook-Hames alleged surveillance was now under active investigation.

November 2004  Levi Bellfield arrested in west London on suspicion of murdering French student Amelie DelaGrange.  Commander BAKER said "There were reasonable grounds to arrest this individual" . A Daily Mail report added, "detectives have previously linked the murder to five other attacks in south-west London."  Publicly at least, no connection was yet made with the Surrey murder of Milly Dowler.

2006  As a consequence of Operation Motorman uncovering prima facie Data Protection Act breaches by journalists of national newspapers (including NOTW), the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) published 'What Price Privacy' and 'What Price Privacy Now?'  These two Reports (here and here) to Parliament and relevant law enforcement bodies detailed industrial scale data procurement by national newspaper titles from private investigators.  The ICO Commissioner also informed the Press Complaints Commission that the ICO would have no hesitation in prosecuting any journalists suspected of similar data breaches in future.

2006-7  Operation Caryatid - the investigation of phone hacking of the royal household by NOTW's Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire. As the sheer volume and extent of phone hacking became apparent, the MET Operation Caryatid team liaised with and briefed other relevant law enforcement agencies (para 72) - including the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).

By this time (from January 2006), the Deputy Director of SOCA was Andre BAKER.

2006-07 was clearly a busy time.  The Haute de la Garenne child abuse scandal in Jersey (in which Jimmy Savile is now implicated) needed a mainland, ACPO-nominated authority to oversee the investigation. Former MET Homicide Commander, Andre BAKER took up the role in addition to his Deputy Director of SOCA duties. This necessitated liaison with Jersey States police and several visits to Jersey.  The controversial Haute de la Garenne investigation was ramped up by lurid, sensationalised  press reporting. A subsequent Review observed (final para)

The approach taken by the States of Jersey Police to releasing information about the teeth found was unusual, not consistent with normal working practice in the UK and encouraged further media reporting and speculation.

2007-09 At the same time, back on the mainland, Surrey Police were still pursuing the Milly Dowler murder investigation as well as allegations of sexual abuse by victims of Jimmy Savile.  Just as knowledge of the NOTW Dowler phone hacking was apparently not shared by Surrey with the MET, it seems perhaps the Surrey team investigating Savile were not informed of crucial information known to MET and Jersey police forces.

Throughout this period, some of the national press were critical of police crime-fighting.  For example, The Sun's crime reporter, Mike Sullivan, castigated Andre BAKER, the MET, and Surrey Police for failing to catch the killers of several murder victims - including Milly Dowler.

2007-08 SOCA researched and complied an intelligence report entitled 'The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry'.  It highlighted the corrosive effect of press collusion in illegal practices such as phone hacking, Police National Computer abuse, computer hacking, corruption, vehicle tracking, surveillance etc etc.

2005-09  Operation Millipede.  This was a lengthy SOCA investigation into a network of private investigators' blagging and computer hacking.  It led to four arrests in 2009 and four convictions in Feb 2012.



July 2009 John Yates undertook an 8 hour consideration of Operation Caryatid before concluding there was no necessity to re-open the investigation.  Two days later, Yates received a written briefing from two of the original Caryatid investigating officers. It reiterated that "briefings of the emerging security risks in relation to mobile phone voicemails were given to SCDI4, The Security Service, Cabinet Office, The Royal Household and SOCA."  (p6)


2010-11  First a New York Times report on phone hacking, then Nick Davies' Guardian exposé of NOTW's hacking of Milly Dowler's mobile phone prompted demand for an independent, judge led Inquiry.  Lord Justice Leveson's Inquiry into 'Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press' started in October 2011.

June 2011  Serial killer Levi Bellfield is finally convicted of the murder of Milly Dowler.

2012  BAKER, Deputy Director of SOCA, moves to another post as Deputy Chief Executive of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) where he will probably be involved with police investigations into the Jimmy Savile scandal.

Andre BAKER will no doubt be grateful that he was not called to give evidence to Leveson, and that his name is relegated to a footnote in the history of Hackgate - a mere bit player at that small, informal Scotland Yard meeting with Rebekah Wade.

Related Articles
Hackgate - Ten To Watch For
Hackgate - Dear Surrey Police
Hackgate - The John Boyall Files
One Rogue Email And The Indestructible Archive 
John Yates And Neil Wallis - A Mutual Understanding
Alex Marunchak - Presumed Innocent

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