A Quiet Word In Your Northern And Shell-Like....

The latest from my regular contributor.

January 12th 2012 was Northern and Shell day at the Leveson inquiry. Northern and Shell is the parent company of Express Newspapers comprising the Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star and the Daily Star Sunday. Amongst questions asked were some about the use of private investigators, 'search agencies', payments, protocols and audit trails.

EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS INTERNAL INVESTIGATION

First to give evidence was Nicole Patterson, barrister, Head of Legal of Express Newspapers. She was then leading an on-going internal investigation into legal compliance 2005-2012, following the News International phone hacking scandal. Her enquiries established the use of 'search agents' and that Express Newspapers journalists

would ask for details of how to contact people or addresses or whatever it was, but I -- at the time that we were looking at, I don't think anybody had really asked, 'How do you do this? How do you find your information?' They were -- as far as we were -- well, I can't say as far as we were aware because until we started having a look at this, I didn't even know that we used these search agencies.

More accurately, there weren't just the five 'search agencies' mentioned in Patterson's evidence which included Express Locate International; Longmere Consultants; Searchline; and SystemsSearches. Passing unmentioned in oral evidence were also AV Legal Services (Leeds) Ltd, AJK Research, BDI (UK) Consultancy and other sources. There is a mass of detailed and informative supporting data in the Patterson Exhibits [NP 2-6] which were not published on the Leveson Inquiry web site until many weeks afterwards thus avoiding much scrutiny (save Reuters, see below).

Oral questioning of Patterson focused in on one particular company used extensively - JJ Services - whose owner Steven Whittamore had been convicted for Data Protection offences early in 2004. Indeed much of the Patterson Exhibits take the form of dense spreadsheets highly reminiscent of the Operation Motorman files.

Q. Right... JJ Services, is that Mr Whittamore's company?
A. I believe it is.
Q. It's clear from documents we are going to look at that your company was engaging JJ Services in 2004 and 2005; is that right?
A. Mm.
Q. Is JJ Services still being used?
A. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Okay. You presumably had in mind the two reports from the Information Commissioner, ""What price privacy?" and "What price privacy now?"
A. Mm-hm.
Q. The papers in the Express Group do feature in the Information Commissioner's table in the second report.
A. Yes.
Q. And we know that JJ Services was really the focus of both reports?
A.Mm.
Q. Did you carry out more detailed enquiries in relation to the activities of JJ Services in 2004 and 2005 of both the financial records and the journalists?
A. No, we didn't...
...the accounts department would have been searching under the name of Whittamore or JJ Services.
Q. What's quite interesting, though, is the dates. The earliest date, at least on this search, is 31 January 2005. He's still carrying out services last year. If you go to 01560 --
A. Mm.
Q. -- you can see the last item there is 30 July 2010 - "Natasha Murat."
A That's a day rate, so £240 would have been a day rate. I don't know what that really means. But the accounts department then prepared this -- the managing editor's office actually prepared this
sheet for me: "Search for possible connection to Robert Murat." What type of search that would have been I really can't tell you. A computer search? I just -- I don't know.
Q. It looks as if your internal inquiry is not getting very far thus far; is that right? 

THE PATTERSON EXHIBITS

Patterson told the Inquiry that the company's internal trawl had showed "more often than not," the amounts paid were neglible: "75 pounds, 80 pounds, 100 pounds. It's very little money." Arguably, even those amounts are quite a lot to pay for mere "...details of how to contact people or addresses or whatever...".

Here are just a sample of the hundreds of 'targets' in the Northern and Shell spreadsheets (Exhibits NP 2-6)

Maxine Carr
Huntley
R Branson
Mark Thompson (Director General BBC)
London Bombers
London Bombings
Millie Dowler (murder victim 2002, Surrey)
David Cameron
Sally Anne Bowman (murder victim 2005, Croydon)
(Tracey) Temple (linked to John Prescott)
(Clive) Bolden (Tracey Temple's ex-husband)
Paul Farrelly (Member of Parliament, Labour, Member of Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 2005-present)
Ken McDonald (former Director of Public Prosecutions)
McCann
Sophia Murat
Litvinenko
Murat
Rob(ert) Murat
Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary)
Clarence Mitchell (spokesman for McCanns)
Kate McCann
Kate McCann
Kate McCann colleague
Kate McCann friends
Ken Livingstone (then Mayor of London)
Sharon Shoesmith (Head of Haringey children's services at the time of the death of 'Baby P')
(Carina) Trimingham (partner of Chris Huhne)
Middleton
David Veness (former Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Operations, Metropolitan Police)
I Puddick
Kelly Hoppen
Bolden
Temple
R(osie) Wintterton (Member of Parliament, Labour)
T(racy) Temple
(Professor John) Tulloch (7/7 London bombing survivor)
C Middleton
Natasha Murat (no relation to Robert Murat)
Rhys Jones (11yr old murder victim, Liverpool)
Vincent Tabak (killer of Joanna Yeates, Bristol)
Jorge Mendonca (former Commanding Officer, Queens Lancashire Regiment, cleared of negligence re Baha Mousa murder)
Stephen Bigby (Oxford St murder victim May 2008)
David Kelly enquiries
Gerald McCann

Just how many times do Northern and Shell need to pay to know the McCann's address?

WHITTAMORE'S 'HIGH-VALUE' COMMISSIONS

When Steve Whittamore's services come under scrutiny, it becomes very clear that most of the high value invoices are from his company. JJ Services has a near-monopoly of high-end commissions, well above the average. The mundane sums of £70-£80 simply do not feature - most of his commissions cost Northern and Shell hundreds, sometimes a thousand or two. Whatever specialist, high-value tasks he was undertaking must have been extraordinarily labour intensive, high risk, sensitive, complex or all of the above.

Here are a sample of Whittamore's 'targets', together with invoice dates and amounts paid. (Exhibit NP2 pp1-3)

* a witchalls 4/24/05 ref 5824 £284,94
* rothermere 2/27/05 ref5797 £2.150,25
* bbc 3/27/05 ref5809 £837.19
* john birt 4/10/05 ref5818 £710,88
* terror bombing enquiry 7/17/05 £1,098,63
* bowman murder 10/2/05 ref5884 £846.00
* oaten 2/2/06 ref5922 £446.50
* alan sugar 3/26/06 ref594 ,£558.13
* temple bolden 4/23/06 ref5951 £1 380.63
* mark thompson 4/30/08 ref16377 £232.65
* farage 6/11/06 ref 5970 £99.88
* middleton 11/5/06 ref 6032 £246.75
* suffolk murders 12/21/06 ref 6053 £ 1,445.25
* murat 8/26/07 ref 6103 £940.00
* mccann 9/22/07 ref 6107 £851.88
* Blankett 8/22 04 ref5707 £2,687.81 (confirmed as transcription error for 'Blunkett' Exhibit NP3 p36)

and see (here).

ROUTINE EXPENSES

Also adduced into evidence to Leveson were some 'taken as read'. Martin Ellice, Group Joint Managing Director of the Northern & Shell Group of Companies, exhibited samples of 3 journalists' expenses claims. Most claims were for takeaways, taxis and tipsters. But one of those journalists detailed some other routine entertaining expenses:
MARTIN STEPHEN ELLICE (taken as read)
Exhibit MSE-1 (here)

p43/80
27/04/2007 £37.50
- Entertaining computer expert contact Steve Whittamore

p48/80
15/05/2008 £9.55
- Entertaining computer contact re telephone numbers

p50/80
02/05/2009 £93.71
- Entertaining computer expert re special enquiries - name available to desk

p56/80
15/05/10 £5.55
- Entertaining computer expert re addresses

All perfectly innocent no doubt, but demonstrating sustained contact with Steve Whittamore and associates long after his conviction (and after the convictions of NOTW Goodman and Mulcaire).

CASH PAYMENTS

At least all the transactions, admin, VAT payable and invoices appear all accountable - even though the exact details of each task brief are not entirely transparent. Clearly Northern and Shell run a tight ship as Paul Ashford (Group Editorial Director) was able to assure the Leveson Inquiry (Paul Ashford Witness Statement here).

Q2: How you understand the system of financial governance to work in principle and in practice at the newspapers owned by your company with particular emphasis on systems to ensure that the newspapers funds are not used to pay bribes or to fund the
gathering of information by illegal methods?
A: The system of financial governance at Express Newspapers, in relation to editorial costs, is as follows: department heads and commissioning editors will commission editorial content. At the end of each month a list of all payments is signed by lan Parrott, Group Managing Editor, and me. lan Parrott and I will query any item which looks out of the ordinary... If a journalist makes a cash payment, they have to reclaim it on expenses, lan Parrott queries all such payments. I understand that they are rare and for relatively small sums.

Strange then that one particular cash expense claim escaped their controlling eyes. The journalist's claim (20/09/2007 p5 here) was for costs incurred for foreign currency exchange. The reason detailed was

Given 1500 euros by office as cash advance to be converted to sterling for cash payment to private eye.

Ian Parrott left Northern and Shell "abruptly" in August 2012. (see here)

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

The Daily Mail Needs To Re-Think Reproof

The latest from my regular contributor.

"Police gave Leveson a dossier on hacking by big firms and lawyers... but he dismissed it in 18 minutes... Evidence about the three-year inquiry was given by Russell Middleton, who was then an acting assistant chief constable for Devon and Cornwall Police." Daily Mail (here)

It seems the Mail have finally discovered some evidence given to Leveson over a year ago about a provincial police investigation more than ten years old. And about time too.

Here's the gist of the Mail 'scoop'.

1 THE MAIL SAYS OF OPERATION REPROOF

A senior officer submitted documents outlining how a little-known three-year inquiry uncovered a nationwide network of corruption. The multi-million-pound investigation found law firms, debt collectors and insurers were behind the thriving underground trade.

The senior officer, Russell Middleton of Devon and Cornwall Police (here), submitted documents called his "Witness Statement", plus short exhibits - just as everyone else who appeared at the Leveson Inquiry. As for the investigation being "little known", it was reported by David Leigh and Nick Davies in the Guardian, July 2011.

illegal PNC (Police National Computer) information had been primarily passed to respectable insurance companies, finance houses and other detective agencies

Either the Daily Mail overlooked the real significance or they missed the Guardian's story altogether. The case collapsed although evidence of blagged targets "identified two ministers and an MP. (Judge) Darlow specifically referred at a pre-trial hearing to the fact that 'particulars in respect of the [then]"chancellor of the exchequer were sought and obtained.' ... PNC checks were made by detective constable Diss on three Labour politicians, according to police interview transcripts obtained by the Guardian. All were in late 2000."

- "The first, on 13 September 2000, was on Martin Salter, the Labour MP for Reading West. Salter had displeased Rebekah Brooks, then News of the World editor. He refused her request to support her notorious campaign for Sarah's Law to 'protect us from pervs'. Shortly afterwards, on 24 September 2000, NoW readers were urged to pillory him personally in a 'naming and shaming' stunt...Salter says: 'She responded with some foul personal attacks so typical of the bullying style of the former NoW. I remember canvassing that Sunday morning and it was particularly unpleasant.' "

- "A few days later, on 18 September, DC Diss was asked to do another check, this time on Nick Brown, the agriculture minister and Labour MP for Newcastle East who had previously been 'outed' as gay by the News of the World."

- "The third occasion came two months later, on 16 November, when a check was requested on 'James Gordon Brown'. The Murdoch papers were at that point taking Blair's side in his continuing feud with Gordon Brown."

The customer sub-contracting procuring the information was private investigator Glenn Lawson of Abbey Investigations in Tyneside:

"Lawson refuses to identify his customer, but the court was told it was believed to be a newspaper.

Also in 2000, it is alleged that a News International title blagged personal data of Gordon Brown. The calls were recorded, you can listen to them, "Recording of The Sunday Times Conman "Blagging" Gordon Brown's Property Details" (here).  For more background on the blagger, Barry Beardall, see here.

2 THE MAIL SAYS EVIDENCE 'DISMISSED'

But despite holding eight months of grueling public hearings at a huge cost to the taxpayer, Leveson dismissed the officer’s evidence in less than 18 minutes.

Really?

Firstly, the obvious point to note is that.... Middleton gave evidence to the Leveson Inquiry - he didn't just wander in off the street. Leveson clearly considered Operation REPROOF evidence was important.

Secondly, Middleton's witness statement was intended to be 'read in' on April 2nd 2012 (as was Brendan Gilmour's evidence on Operation GLADE - more below). However on reflection, Leveson decided the importance to the Inquiry and public knowledge of REPROOF necessitated evidence to be given in person. Middleton was therefore required to appear on May 9th. 'Required to appear' are the operative words - Leveson ensured Operation REPROOF was aired by serving Russell Middleton with a Section 21 notice for compulsory attendance.

Thirdly, far from dismissing REPROOF as the Daily Mail says, there is an entire chapter on it in The Leveson Inquiry Report, together with its progeny Operation GLADE. And the next section is devoted entirely to linked Operation MOTORMAN. (Volume I, Chapter 2 pp251-257)

Fourthly, the crucial nature of REPROOF is also demonstrated by a representative sample of police forces being asked by the Inquiry if and how reflecting on Reproof had contributed to tightening their PNC security. Each was asked

Were changes made to any policies, procedures or systems relating to use of the databases and the security of the same following Operations Motorman, Glade and Reproof? If so, please specify.

Responses were patchy -

- Chief Constable, West Midlands Police: "I don’t believe so."

- Director of Information, Metropolitan Police Service: "No specific changes were made to my knowledge as a direct result of these operations..."

- Chief Constable, Durham Constabulary: "Durham Constabulary reviewed and replaced our policy for Notifiable Associations. This policy advises staff on when they need to notify the organisation of an association or friendship with someone who could pose a risk of compromise to that individual. Of particular note is the application of the current policy to private detectives.
The recommendations from the Information Commissioners Office were also the catalyst for the streamlining of an online internal confidential reporting system called ’Bad Apple’, as well as the procurement of an improved covert audit and monitoring system."

- National Service Manager for National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPI): "I am unable to answer this question for two reasons. I was not in post at this time and therefore have no personal knowledge of any system changes. I have also looked for references within the change control system that records all system changes to PNC that have been made or are awaiting implementation but none were identified that referred to these operations."

- Assistant Chief Constable, Surrey Police: "I am not aware of any changes made after these operations."

3 THE DAILY MAIL SAYS NO MEDIA OR JOURNALISTS INVOLVED

He told Leveson he ‘never found any direct evidence or indirect evidence linking that information being requested by or for any part of the media or journalists’.

Technically true - but not quite the whole story.

A. I think I need to make clear they weren't out of scope.The whole inquiry right from the outset was extremely open, an open-minded approach as to what we would discover.
Q There was a link -- and this brings in, I suppose, the nexus with other operations -- with a company called Data Research based in Surrey; is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
... (We)"actually briefed the Information Commissioner's office as to what we were doing, we were aware of an interest they had in that company, we came to an agreement with the Information Commissioner that they would come along with us on the search...their investigation, Operation Motorman, then led to Operation Glade, so you could track it back and say that the seizure of that document at Data Research subsequently led to those two investigations

So REPROOF was the genesis of MOTORMAN and thence GLADE. Devon and Cornwall Police drew up a contract with the ICO which enabled D&C Police able to focus on their own investigation into an Exmouth private investigations company sub-contracted by a variety of corporate clients. That is not to say that the mass of undisclosed material from REPROOF would not be very revealing, but it explains how it was that the ICO contracted to follow on investigating press 'dark arts' specifically. For more detail on the enmeshment of Operations REPROOF, MOTORMAN, GLADE and SOCA report Project RIVERSIDE see (here).

REPROOF'S LEGACY: MOTORMAN AND GLADE

The ICO's Operation MOTORMAN in turn briefed both SOCA and the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) at the MET - the latter launched their Operation GLADE into four specific individuals suspected of conspiracy to misconduct in public office. The MET investigation was deemed senior to ICO's MOTORMAN and thus took precedence. This was because the ICO could only bring 'lesser' charges under the Data Protection Act (DPA) which lacks custodial sentences.

Two of GLADE'S four defendants (a civilian police worker and a retired MET office) pleaded guilty. However, the two private investigators - John BOYALL and Steve WHITTAMORE - did not. It seems that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) made a bit of a hash of the prosecutions. (ICO Leveson Exhibit)

the ICO has liaised properly with the other prosecuting authorities in this case so as to enable them to know what the position is in relation to our proceedings. However it would appear that others have not liaised properly... information that had been passed [to ICO] by the CPS in relation to Operation Glade [shows]... that their Counsel had not carried out the appropriate exercise in relation to disclosure that should have been carried out and as such the CPS in Operation Glade were under intense pressure to seek a conclusion to their case that did not attract undue criticism, thereby leaving them open to offers in relation to specific Data Protection offences...

The decision to downgrade their case from misconduct to simple data protection act offences may be for a number of reasons however it is clear that the CPS did not do the disclosure exercise which placed them under intolerable pressure and therefore it seemed that they would take whatever Whittamore would offer and they accepted a basis of plea on a reckless basis. The manner in which the basis of plea was drafted was indicative of Defence Counsel being given a free reign to draft whatever basis of plea he wanted.

In other words, their bungled evidence disclosure left the CPS forced to agree the lesser DPA offences anyway, in order to avoid reputational damage. BOYALL and WHITTAMORE then pleaded guilty to the lesser offences and received small fines.

(And Whittamore received a character reference from a London Silk, Jerome Lynch QC, to use in his sentence mitigation argument.)

THE MAIL AND MOTORMAN

It's quite astonishing really how, flying in the face of the evidence, the Mail's report on REPROOF avoids any reference to its links to MOTORMAN and the bigger Hackgate picture. But then the Mail has a history with MOTORMAN, doesn't it? You can read an explanation 'The Motorman Files and Dacre's Dilemma' (here)

If there is a current clamouring for naming and shaming corporate clients of private investigators then those arguments hold equally true for releasing the MOTORMAN files into the public domain.

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Witness Protection, Anyone?

The latest from my regular contributor.

"The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry and Others Unlawfully Trading in Personal Data"

The first version Serious Organised Crime Agency report (2008) was made public in July 2012. It said (p5) there was evidence that private investigators were
(c) accessing details of current investigations against a criminal or criminal group;
(h) attempting to discover location of witnesses

A second version SOCA report (2008) was published July 2013. That version gave more detail, stating private investigators were also (p6)

(j) attempting to discover identity of CHlSes; (Covert Human Intelligence Sources)
(l) attempting to discover location of witnesses under police protection to intimidate them:

July 2nd 2013
The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) took evidence from SOCA's Chair SIR IAN ANDREWS and Director General TREVOR PEARCE. (transcript here)

HASC Chair Keith Vaz cited recent press reports brought to the Committee's attention: "We have also read that private investigators were hired by criminal gangs to infiltrate the witness protection programme... there are criminal acts that have taken place here. The breaking into the witness protection programme is a pretty serious issue.

Trevor Pearce: Other than seeing in the media reporting, I have never heard anything formerly. As a law enforcement officer who has had some significant engagement with the undercover world and the protected persons’ world, I have not heard of that before."

July 9th 2013 
HASC took evidence from Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) CRESSIDA DICK. Nicola Blackwood MP asked about the security and integrity of the MET witness protection programme given press reports of breaches by corrupt private investigators, as mentioned in the 2008 SOCA Report. CRESSIDA DICK responded by clarifying that the SOCA Report was a "strategic analysis of MET material". so it gave nothing to the MET by way of NEW information. She said however that the MET Directorate of Professional Standards and Witness Protection were "highly alert to the media coverage." A scoping exercice is currently underway. Though it was "not surprising serious organised criminals" might attempt to access information on those in witness protection, "we have not had any examples."

"There is risk..., intelligence sometimes that they are seeking to do so...(but) we are not aware of anything in the Metropolitan Police of infiltration of witness protection."

SOCA REPORT SOURCE MATERIAL
The SOCA strategic analysis utilised five indicative serious crime investigations, plus incorporated intelligence from the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) investigation Operation MOTORMAN. (for background see here)

There was a joint Devon and Cornwall Police/ICO raid at the premises of private investigator John BOYALL which revealed that he and another private investigator - Steve WHITTAMORE- were both engaged in illegal data procurement (here).

The seizure included evidence of attempted access to extremely confidential material, according to ICO investigating officer Alex Owens (p4 here):

One VRM (Vehicle Registraion Mark) particular was of great concern to me because clearly written alongside it was ’Protected Number’; Having served within Special Branch during my Police service I knew this particular VRM must relate to a very sensitive individual or operation within the Police. This was subsequently confirmed to me by the Metropolitan Police although I requested no detail.

Boyall sold information on as he was "Sub-contracted to supply information to Stephen Whittamore. Whittamore, Boyall, King and Marshall (Operation Glade) were charged with conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. Boyall and Whittamore were later charged with obtaining information contrary to s55 of the DPA 1998 and received conditional discharge 15.4.05." (p213 here)

OPERATION CARYATID
One of the five serious crime investigations assessed by SOCA was Operation CARYATID which had resulted in custodial sentences for Clive GOODMAN and private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The Investigating Officer (IO) Keith Surtees described the initial handling of the chaotic Mulcaire papers seized on his arrest (p50 here)

I don't recognise a notebook, because I don't recall actually finding one or seeing one. I do recall lots of loose-leaf A4 pieces of paper, as I've said, with various stages of research on, and I think I refer to that within this decision. I see that through the process of -- I think it's probably from August 9, 10 (2006) onwards. I firstly negotiate a group of officers, I think somewhere in the region of 20 or 30 officers, who I negotiate because they're not anti-terrorist branch officers because they're all busy doing Operation Overt and everything else. They're Special Branch officers, they're vetted to the highest level, and it's those officers, I negotiate their overtime, because they're working through weekends when they should be off, and they work through I think for a period of five to seven days to go through all of the documentation, and with that they're briefed by me at the beginning around what I want them to do with that in the first instance, which is to ascertain whether there's anything to undermine or assist the police case with regard to Goodman and Mulcaire, because by then we've charged both Goodman and Mulcaire and my obligations under CPIA kick in

THE MET GIVES EVIDENCE
A flawed victim notification policy was challenged later, in September 2011, when there was the Judicial Review -

THE QUEEN on the application of (Claimants) ,CHRIS BRYANT MP, BRIAN PADDICK, LORD PRESCOTT, 'HJK', BEN JACKSON
and the COMMISSIONER of the POLICE of the METROPOLIS (Defendant)

The claimants alleged the MET had failed to notify them that they had been phone hacking targets of private investigator Glenn MULCAIRE. The MET's Mark Maberly was required to give a statement in evidence. He had been Case Officer of the original investigation into Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire - Operation CARYATID. Maberly's statement said (para 50)

On 23rd November 2006 a report was produced by the Directorate of Professional Standards which detailed the results of the examination of the computers and other storage media recovered during the original searches. The report would have been collected shortly after. Included within the report was a computerised address and phonebook of contacts including potential targets. The contents of the report were brought to the attention of the Investigating Officer Keith Surtees. Following on from receipt of this report and in consultation with the SIO, DC Green and I met with an officer from the witness protection unit. There was concern that within the contents of the report were the details of persons who were given new identities as part of a witness protection programme. Those in the programme would include both witnesses and defendants to high profile serious crime. I provided the list for him to view and it quickly became apparent that contained within were names of interest to him. I provided him with a copy of the report to take away. I had no further contact with this officer about the report or the details contained within.

Keith Surtees' evidence to Leveson concurred (p72-73 here):

MR JAY: There were names though in the project list, as it were, that according to Detective Sergeant Maberly were on the witness protection programme. Is that something you knew about?
A. Yes. It was brought to my attention that some names here within this document may well have been from the witness protection programme. What I instructed DS Maberly to do was to contact the witness protection unit, get them to come across to our office, show them the document, get them to look at it, and if there were any risks to people they were protecting, take whatever mitigation they needed to take to protect them. I didn't ask or seek information from the witness protection people around the quantity or individual details of who --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not individual details, but weren't you interested to know whether it was in fact the case?
A. I knew it was the case on some of them because it was quite obvious it was the case.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Didn't that itself create an enormous issue for you? This must be among some of the most confidential information that's held.
A. Yes, and the officer from the witness protection unit was best placed to take whatever remedial action needed to be taken in regards to that. In terms of the provenance of the information, that also concerned me, yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you didn't do anything about that.
A. I had conversations throughout May, June, July and August in terms of the investigation. I had conversations August, September, October, November with regards to the various drips of information that were coming through, and briefed those up.
Q But in that context, if the conspiracy was limited to Goodman and Mulcaire, there would be concern but there wouldn't be enormous concern, but if the conspiracy went wider, as you suspected it did, to others at News International, that concern would be multiplied, wouldn't it, in relation to possible prejudice to those on the witness protection programme?
A. Witness protection programme, access to government ministers, access to military, right across. There were lots and lots of concerns, yes, including the witness protection issues, yes. 

CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, this seems to be the chain of communications:

- Metropolitan Police Service SPECIALIST OPERATIONS undertook the original phone hacking investigation - Operation CARYATID - into Goodman and Mulcaire.

- The CARYATID Team borrowed a crew of expensive SPECIAL BRANCH officers with elite Developed Vetting status to undertake a preliminary sift and summary of the Mulcaire papers.

- The resultant summaries revealed that multiple, highly sensitive witness information had been compromised. That sensitive information was communicated to the WITNESS PROTECTION UNIT by the Investigating Officer, who also briefed it up through SPECIALIST OPERATIONS.

- Then the MET provided SOCA with extensive information on the Goodman/Mulcaire investigation for strategic assessment. SOCA undertook its crucial risk analysis , including CARYATID and MOTORMAN, and circulated their restricted Report to key senior policy-makers and agencies.

- The MET was provided with the SOCA Report in Feb 2008. The Director General of SOCA believes it would have gone to the Directorate of Professional Standards and/ or to the Deputy Commissioner.

But five years later, in 2013, neither SOCA nor current ACSO MET SPECIALIST OPERATIONS have ever heard of any private investigator compromising highly secret witness protection data. And that is despite two senior (still serving) officers giving very public evidence twice - to the Judicial Review and to the Leveson Inquiry.

Hackgate has certainly prompted senior rank resignations at the MET. But this can only partially account for the apprently poor 'corporate memory'.

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You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

The John Boyall Files

The latest piece from my regular contributor.

You win some, you lose some.

Following a four-day hearing last week, the large group of phone-hacking civil claimants won the right to see 9 key Glenn Mulcaire emails. On the downside, Justice Vos said they have enough disclosure material for the current cases so they lost on one issue -

The phone-hacking claimants were seeking further disclosure in relation to Mulcaire's activities before 2001 in an effort to establish whether voicemail interception had taken place earlier than admitted by News International during the course of the civil litigation proceedings

So, restricting the disclosure window  to post-2001? Narrowing the parameters? Isn't that one of the strategies that drew criticism to Operation Caryatid - the original phone hacking 2006 investigation? Has nothing been learnt?

It is to be hoped that an arbitrary 2001 date in the civil cases is not taken as a precedent for ongoing and future police investigations or Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charging decisions into journalist/private investigator 'dark arts'.  Clearly, the phone hacking victims are not the only ones needing to know the genesis and extent of the 'dark arts' - it is in the wider public interest.

Irrespective of Mulcaire having or not having a direct contract with News International pre-2001, it is in the public domain that he was undertaking investigative work for them.

All through the late 1990s, the paper had been hiring an investigator called John Boyall, who, among other services, specialised in acquiring information from confidential databases. He had a wiry young man working as his assistant, named Glenn Mulcaire. In the autumn of 2001, John Boyall fell out with the News of the World's assistant editor, Greg Miskiw, who had been responsible for handling him. Miskiw replaced him by poaching Glenn Mulcaire and giving him a full-time contract.

John Boyall - at the time that he was employing Mulcaire - came to police attention.  Devon and Cornwall Constabulary scoped intelligence that a nationwide network of private investigators was illegally obtaining information from the Police National Computer (PNC).  That scoping led to an investigation called Operation Reproof.  In turn, Operation Reproof led to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) investigation Operation Motorman into data offences, and a Metropolitan Police (MET) investigation - Operation Glade.  For more information, see 'Revisiting Operation Reproof and Other Police Operations'

Devon and Cornwall police organised a raid of business premises outside London associated with Boyall.  ICO investigators were invited to accompany, to deal with suspected Data Protection breaches. Material was seized which indicated corrupt DVLA sources, plus a wealth of other incriminating documentation including commissions from Steve Whittamore (see Alex Owens' evidence to Leveson).

What is less clear is what happened to the wealth of evidentiary material.seized in the Boyall raid.  This of course begs questions - what time period do the 'Boyall Files' cover? Do they include material that may shed light on Boyall and Mulcaire's pre-2001 'dark arts' activities for journalists? Were their specialist corruption and blagging skills commissioned and deployed for other private investigators? Is there material relevant to other contemporaneous police investigations, for example, Operation Nigeria?

Given the MET's past record of effective searches of 'unused material' and their vague, hazy explanation of how long they keep it safe after convictions (five, six, seven years..?) one could be pessimistic. If it weren't for Nick Davies' reports in the Guardian, the Mulcaire material in bin bags may well have found their way into a MET incinerator.  But the best place to start may be via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to the Information Commissioner's Office itself.  As the entity responsible for ensuring FOI compliance, doubtless they would welcome the opportunity to answer a few questions - in the public interest:

Where are the Boyall Files and unused material?

Were the Boyall Files passed on or copied to the MET for use in Operation Glade?

Did Devon and Cornwall Constabulary retain the Boyall Files and unused material for use in the abortive Operation Reproof prosecutions?

Were the Boyall Files incorporated into the spreadsheets of the more-famous Motorman Files?

Where is the unused material from Operation Motorman, given that the earliest data relate to 1996?

Were copies of the Boyall Files and unused material provided to the MET for use in Operation Caryatid?

Have the ICO been asked, or given, permission for the destruction of any or all of the Boyall Files and/or related material?

At least two allegations of pre-2001 phone hacking were given in evidence to Lord Justice Leveson:

• James Hipwell's evidence asserted phone hacking at The Mirror 1998-2000
• Dominic Mohan described how newspapers, in 1998, hacked into the mobile phones of members of the Irish Government to expose lax security.

Therefore there seems to be an argument for locating and preserving pre-2001 material - especially relating to Mulcaire - before it is lost, destroyed or compromised.  The clock is ticking to get it preserved fast.

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